



Fairness and the Challenge of Making Markets Work
Better
Niamh Dunne∗
This article explores the revival of fairness as the lodestar of EU competition enforcement. It
considers the theory and evolving discourse of fairness, then identifies and evaluates examples
of fairness-oriented enforcement activity. Concluding that fairness represents a distinct devel-
opment from the ‘hipster antitrust’ movement, the article suggests reasons to explain the shift,
including a need to rehabilitate the social market economy in an age of market-scepticism, and
to facilitate the progressive expansion of competition law to address modern market failures.
INTRODUCTION
Well-functioning markets can be quite brutal. The dispassionate language of
market-clearing often disguises more dramatic stories of disappointed rivals,
fickle customer preferences, the exclusion of vulnerable consumers, and even
gales of creative destruction which drive innovation by destroying what has
come before. A question of increasing prominence, however, is whether the
notion of a well-functioning market requires some degree of fairness in its op-
eration or outcomes. An issue of broader relevance in an era when faith in
market-based mechanisms is under increasing strain, this article focuses on the
question as it arises in the competition law context – described as the ‘fight over
antitrust’s soul’.1 Not only is this a field where the clash between fairness and
the quotidian brutality of the market mechanism is particularly acute; more-
over ‘[c]ompetition rules have large footprints,’2 with knock-on effects across
a spectrum of adjacent public policy areas. This article explores the purported
revival of fairness as the lodestar of enforcement within the European Union
(EU), alongside potential explanations for this shift in practice.
The issue has come to public attention through the ‘fairness mantra’3 associ-
ated with Margrete Vestager’s tenure at DG Competition.Recent enforcement
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activity reinforces the perception that, after several decades during which com-
petition law pivoted towards a ‘more economic approach,’ this nominal con-
sensus may be less than settled. The proposition that the competition process
should deliver fairness raises challenging questions: from what is fairness, to fair-
ness for whom? A critical account may view this development as sloganeering –
a ‘weasel word’4 – or an attempt to politicise or corrupt the application of these
ostensibly technical rules. This article explores such tensions, revisiting well-
worn questions about the goals of competition law, yet endeavouring to place
these within the distinctive circumstances of the contemporary internal market.
The following section sets the scene, describing the shift from fairness-based
enforcement, to the more economic approach, and back again. The legal im-
plications of these changes are unclear, however, for two reasons. First, although
the concept appears throughout the EU competition framework, at no point
is fairness defined. Indeed, fairness is amenable to multiple competing, even
conflicting definitions, creating a lack of clarity about what a fairness standard
requires. This is considered in the third section. Second, although the rhetoric
of fairness is distinct from that of the more economic approach, the Commis-
sion insists that the former is not only compatible with, but is a manifestation
of, the latter. Yet, as explained in the fourth section, not only are these con-
cepts difficult to reconcile linguistically or theoretically but much of the tenor
and focus of recent enforcement moves away from an economic approach as
strictly understood. Accordingly, the rhetorical shift towards a fairness standard
occurs alongside a shift in enforcement practice, which may or may not mir-
ror these changes in discourse. The fifth section asks: why now? If we accept
that the contemporary fairness mantra represents a substantive departure from
previously declared policy,what explains this, particularly coming so soon after,
and in apparent contradiction of, the initial corrective of the more economic
approach?
SETTING THE SCENE: FAIRNESS TO EFFICIENCY AND BACK
AGAIN?
EU law incorporates a wide spectrum of competition rules. Like most systems,
it has rules regulating collusion,5 dominance,6 and mergers.7 It also includes
provisions that are EU-specific, including rules against State aids8 and State
measures that require antitrust violations.9 What unites these discrete provi-
sions are the overarching policy objectives served.The thorny question of what
motivates EU competition law is one which perpetually sparks debate, and to
4 J.Laitenberger, ‘EU competition law in innovation and digital markets: fairness and the consumer
welfare perspective’ Speech, 10 October 2017 (JL Speech, 10 October 2017).
5 Art 101 TFEU.
6 Art 102 TFEU.
7 Regulation 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ L24/1, 29
January 2004).
8 Arts 107-109 TFEU.
9 Art 106(1) TFEU.
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which arguably no definitive answer can be given.10 Our focus is the pursuit of
fairness as an enforcement goal within the evolving EU system: a question of
renewed importance in light of recent polarised debates about the necessity of
significant changes in the antitrust area, in Europe and further afield.
The concept of fairness is not an unknown quantity in EU competition
law. The language of fairness has been present within the textual framework
since the Treaty of Rome, and it continues to have a prominent role within the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Preamble to
the TFEU includes an overarching reference to ‘fair competition,’while Articles
101 and 102 refer to ‘a fair share’ for consumers and ‘unfair purchase or selling
prices or other unfair trading conditions,’ respectively. It has furthermore been
argued that the prohibition on selective advantages under the State aid rules
‘self-evidently’ reflects notions of fairness ‘within the ordinary meaning of the
word’.11 Accordingly, at least formally, fairness has always been a consideration
within the competition framework.
Fairness has instinctive appeal as a policy objective.Fairness discourse extends
beyond competition law to embrace a range of policy areas, including asylum,12
labour law,13 insolvency,14 data privacy15 and private law theory.16 Proponents
argue that the pursuit of fairness links directly to the ‘social rationale’ for com-
petition law.17 The idea is put forcefully by Marco Colino: ‘It makes little sense
to defend a competition policy that develops with its back purposefully turned
to the attainment of moral and social justice.’18 Accordingly, fairness is posited as
a central concern because, otherwise, there is little point to market intervention
if not to generate fairer outcomes.
Much depends upon what is understood by fairness, a point considered in
the next section.Yet even if what might be broadly construed as a fairness-based
approach was evident during the early years of the EU system, it became more
difficult to make the case for a central role later on. Instead, the last couple of
decades have witnessed the explicit adoption of the so-called more economic
approach by the European Commission.19 From this perspective, the pursuit
of economic efficiency is the primary if not the sole objective of competition
enforcement. The impetus for this shift was, at least partly, in response to con-
siderable criticism of the existing jurisprudence: criticism summed up in the
10 M. Motta,Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
2004) 17-30; and A. Ezrachi, ‘Sponge’ (2017) 5 J Antitrust Enforcement 49.
11 M. Vestager, ‘Competition and fairness in a digital society’ Speech, 22 November 2018 (MV
Speech, 22 November 2018)
12 E.Küçük, ‘The Principle of Solidarity and Fairness in Sharing Responsibility:More than Win-
dow Dressing?’ (2016) 23 ELJ 448.
13 A. Sanders, ‘Fairness in the Contract of Employment’ (2017) 46 Industrial Law Journal 506.
14 S. Paterson, ‘Debt Restructuring and Notions of Fairness’ (2017) 80 MLR 600.
15 D. Clifford and J. Ausloos ‘Data Protection and the Role of Fairness’ (2018) 37 YEL 130.
16 G.S. Alexander, Property and Human Flourishing (Oxford: OUP, 2018) and N.J. McBride, The
Humanity of Private Law (Oxford: Hart, 2018).
17 D.Gerard, ‘Fairness in EU Competition Policy: Significance and Implications’ (2018) 9 JECLAP
211, 211.
18 S. Marco Colino, ‘The Antitrust F Word: Fairness Considerations in Competition Law’ 2018
CUHK Faculty of Law Research Paper No 2018-09, 18.
19 A useful study is A.C.Witt, The More Economic Approach to EU Competition Law (Oxford: Hart,
2016).
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provocation, ‘we protect competition, you protect competitors’.20 The upshot
is that the ‘modernised’ competition framework gives short shrift to fairness
as a standalone value. At first glance, therefore, the movement towards a more
economic approach heralded an era of what might be termed ‘post-fairness’
antitrust within the EU.
Yet this too has been overtaken by developments which swing the pendu-
lum back towards a fairness-imbued approach.As explained in the fifth section
below, it is crucial to appreciate the broader context here. The fairness debate
emerged at a tense and disruptive moment in economic and political terms
globally: a time of increased public mistrust of market institutions;21 greater
awareness of inequality;22 and a rise in political populism with its associated
hostility towards established institutions.23 The past decade was a time of crisis
for Europe:the Eurozone,migration,rule-of-law,and Brexit crises.24 As part of a
multi-pronged response to the tide of Euroscepticism that this ‘polycrisis’25 en-
gendered,26 searching questions are being asked about ‘the future of Europe,’27
with acknowledgement of ‘doubts about the EU’s social market economy and
its ability to deliver on its promise to leave no one behind’.28 Finally, alongside
the revival of fairness rhetoric in Europe, an equivalent debate occurred across
the Atlantic, the ‘hipster antitrust’ movement.29 Essentially a backlash against
the minimalist vision of the Chicago School, its proponents call for a funda-
mental rethinking of how the US enforces antitrust law. In short, the argument
is for more aggressive intervention, against a broader range of market failures,
which casts off the shackles of the existing neutered framework.By challenging
ostensibly settled assumptions so fundamentally, hipster antitrust throws down
a gauntlet that need not be embraced but cannot be ignored.
It is thus unsurprising that, despite the nominal triumph of the more eco-
nomic approach, competition policy discourse has become preoccupied with
the so-called antitrust ‘F’ word.30 The re-emergence of fairness is associated,
most notably, with the tenure of Commissioner Vestager at DG Competition.
The most obvious manifestation is rhetorical: Vestager placed the concept of
fairness front and centre in the large majority of competition policy speeches
delivered during her first term in office. This was followed by a subsequent
20 E. Fox, ‘“We Protect Competition,You Protect Competitors”’ (2003) 26World Competition 149.
21 E. Luce,The Retreat of Western Liberalism (London: Little, Brown, 2017).
22 T. Piketty,Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press, 2014).
23 M. Caiani and P. Graziano, ‘Understanding varieties of populism in times of crises’ (2019) 43
West European Politics 1141.
24 J. Zeitlin, F. Nicoli and B. Laffan, ‘Introduction: the European Union beyond the polycrisis?’
(2019) 26 JEPP 963.
25 ‘Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Annual General Meeting of the Hellenic Fed-
eration of Enterprises’ 21 June 2016.
26 S.B. Hobolt and C.E. de Vries, ‘Public Support for European Integration’ (2016) 19 Annual
Review of Political Science 413; F. Nicoli, ‘Hard-line Euroscepticism and the Eurocrisis’ (2017) 55
JCMS 312; and L. Hooghe and G. Marks, ‘Cleavage Theory Meets Europe’s Crises’ (2018) 25
JEPP 109.
27 European Commission,White Paper on the Future of Europe COM(2017)2025.
28 ibid, 9.
29 An overview of differing perspectives is found in CPI Antitrust Chronicle Spring 2018, vol 1
No 1, entitled ‘Hipster Antitrust’.
30 Marco Colino, n18 above.
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(re)embracing of the language of fairness by Commission officials, academic
commentators and the EU legislator. As explained in the fourth section,more-
over, fairness-based reasoning is increasingly discernible within Commission
enforcement activity.What is described as Vestager’s ‘fairness mantra’31 has, ac-
cordingly, put the concept, squarely and inescapably, back on the competition
policy agenda.
FAIRNESS: THEORY AND RHETORIC
As noted, the concept of fairness is used throughout the Treaty framework to
set the acceptable parameters of the free functioning of markets. Fairness is not
defined in EU law, however, nor is it obvious that a single conception applies
across the instances where it is invoked. Fairness is an inherently malleable con-
cept, meaning different things to different people; while certain conceptions
may fundamentally conflict: my fair shake comes precisely at your expense, at
least in your eyes. In order to understand what fairness (may) mean as a le-
gal term-of-art, this section explores ideas of fairness as it relates to economic
organisation and activity: that is, ‘fair competition’. We approach the question
from two angles: theoretical perspectives, and the modern fairness mantra.
It is necessary to acknowledge, however, the limited ambit of competition
law, the role of which is often described as ‘making markets work better’.32
Competition law is premised upon the effective functioning of the market
mechanism, free from abusive exercises of market power. It is, consequently,
conducive to achieving policy goals that are contingent upon, or furthered by,
open and undistorted competition. Competition law also utilises a tort/crime
rather than a regulatory model: proscribing categories of behaviour, rather than
dictating ex ante the activities of market actors.33 Any conception of fairness
advanced regarding competition law must acknowledge the mode and com-
paratively modest scope of operation of the rules themselves: limitations not
always obvious within more politically-influenced discussions of antitrust-as-
fairness.
Theories of fairness
We start with fairness in theory.At its most basic, fairness connotes rules of ‘fair
play’.34 Fair competition is that conducted in accordance with the established
rules of the market.As a ‘joint enterprise,’ those who opt to (potentially) benefit
from participation in market activities must respect and follow the rules that
bind other participants.35
31 n 3 above.
32 European Commission,The EU Explained: Competition.Making Markets Work Better (2017).
33 D.A. Crane, ‘Antitrust Antifederalism’ (2008) 96 Cal L Rev 1, 14-15.
34 G. Klosko, ‘The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation’ (1987) 98 Ethics 353, 353.
35 H.L.A. Hart, ‘Are there any Natural Rights?’ (1955) 64 Philosophical Review 175, 185.
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Identifying precisely what market rules demarcate the boundaries of fair play
is rather trickier. Rawls’ celebrated original position, for instance, equates fair-
ness with objectivity, alongside some degree of equity and solidarity.36 By lo-
cating his protagonists behind a veil of ignorance, the aim is to derive principles
that are inherently ‘fair’ rather than tailored to advantage the decisionmakers’
individual interests: to ‘leav[e] aside those aspects of the social world that seem
arbitrary from a moral point-of-view.’37 Yet the determination of arbitrariness
itself involves value judgments. For Nozick, for example, the fairness of an in-
dividual distribution depended only on how it came about.38 Whereas Rawls
emphasised the inherent randomness (and thus amorality) of any original dis-
tribution, Nozick was concerned with how individuals subsequently chose ‘to
develop their own natural assets.’39 Their disagreement effectively goes to the
heart of fairness as it pertains to the market mechanism, where success may
depend upon a difficult-to-disentangle combination of incumbency advantage,
effort, underhand tactics, and sheer dumb luck.
In the context of market competition specifically, fairness is often contrasted
with welfare economics. Kaplow and Shavell define the latter as decision-
making that is geared towards enhancing individual well-being, encompassing
material needs and wants and intangible benefits.40 Fairness implies decision-
making not based exclusively on how it affects well-being,but instead incorpo-
rating some essentially ‘moral’ principle such as corrective or retributive justice
or promise-keeping.41 While welfare economics is concerned with maximising
beneficial outcomes, and is thus indifferent to the relative treatment or moral
culpability of actors, fairness is unconcerned with outcomes, provided that the
applicable principle is employed correctly. Yet this non-consequentialist vision,
central to economic analysis of law, finds limited support in behavioural eco-
nomics. For Kahneman et al,who examined the perceived fairness of individual
transactions through survey evidence,42 ‘the phrase “it is fair”is simply an abbre-
viation for “a substantial majority of the population studied think it is fair”.’43
These majoritarian assessments are governed by a principle of ‘dual entitle-
ment’: the notion that all sides should gain from a transaction.44 Public opinion
forms around a ‘reference transaction,’ being the perceived normal and thus
appropriate division. Two important aspects follow. First, normalcy is not nec-
essarily aligned with justice, so that a majority of the public may consider an
outcome fair even if not morally correct. Second, since the reference transac-
tion can change over time, fairness is a dynamic concept, as perceptions change
with it.45
36 J. Rawls,A Theory of Justice (Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press, 1999).
37 ibid, 14.
38 R.Nozick, ‘Distributive Justice’ (1973) 3 Philosophy & Public Affairs 45.
39 ibid, 108.
40 L.Kaplow and S.Shavell,Fairness versus Welfare (Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,2002)
18.
41 ibid, 39.
42 D. Kahneman, J.L. Knetsch and R. Thaler, ‘Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitle-
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Yet these higher-level assessments leave us little the wiser about the mechan-
ics of fairness as a standard for intervention, for which we must turn to accounts
developed for the antitrust context.There is often a reluctance to articulate pre-
cisely what fairness requires under competition law. Some work focuses on the
descriptive questions of how and when issues of fairness arise, without seek-
ing to provide an overarching solution to these overlapping demands.46 Others
view fairness in political terms, focused on the ‘moral intuition’47 that mar-
ket power concentrated in a small number of firms is morally repugnant, en-
abling dominant actors to gain unfair advantages at the expense of ‘the welfare
of the powerless’.48 From this perspective, and in a landscape where ‘markets,
morality and society cannot realistically be separated,’49 the control of market
power should target inefficient behaviour and unfair practices, as the latter in-
evitably exacerbate societal unfairness more generally.Despite its circular logic,
Gerbrandy’s definition of fairness as the pursuit of market outcomes ‘accept-
able to society’50 usefully emphasises the extent to which the goal of ‘a highly
competitive social market economy’51 therefore precludes an exclusive focus on
efficiency.
Yet purely descriptive or politically oriented accounts fail to provide an ap-
plicable legal standard for the task of enforcement.A prominent idea informing
the latter is the ‘level playing field’: the notion that all firms should have the
same initial opportunities in the marketplace.52 This equality of opportunity ap-
proach is associated with German Ordo-liberalism,53 and reflected in the refrain
that the competition system ‘aims to protect not only the interests of competi-
tors or of consumers, but also the structure of the market and, in so doing,
competition as such.’54 From this perspective, fairness demands that would-be
market participants have equivalent access to enter and compete, without prej-
udice to the success of that participation. Yet the simple notion of the level
playing field can be hellishly complex, particularly where rival firms are differ-
ently resourced, operate under different business models, or offer differentiated
products. Moreover, fairness from this perspective is pitched solely in terms of
the supply side of the equation, while any resulting advantages for consumers
or society more broadly are mere collateral benefits.
Construing fairness in terms of ex post equity – equality of outcome – is more
difficult to square with the task of ‘making markets work better’. As Motta ex-
plains, ‘markets work so that firms which invest more, innovate more, or simply
46 E.J. Hughes, ‘The Left Side of Antitrust: What Fairness Means and Why it Matters’ (1994) 77
Maquette L Rev 265, and F. Ducci and M. Trebilcock, ‘The Revival of Fairness Discourse in
Competition Policy’ (2019) 64 Antitrust Bulletin 79.
47 A. Ayal, Fairness in Antitrust (Oxford: Hart, 2016) 99.
48 Ezrachi and Stucke, n 1 above, 1.
49 A.Gerbrandy, ‘Conceptualizing Big Tech As ‘Modern Bigness’ and Its Implications for European
Competition Law’ 2019, 3 at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3275235.
50 A. Gerbrandy, ‘Rethinking Competition Law within the European Economic Constitution’
(2019) 57 JCMS 127, 129.
51 Art 3(3) TEU.
52 Motta, n 10 above, 26.
53 D.J.Gerber,Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe:Protecting Prometheus (Oxford:OUP,
1998).
54 C–501/06P GlaxoSmithKline EU:C:2009:610 at [63].
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are luckier than others will be more successful’.55 Yet it is possible to envisage
fairness standards even here. Alhborn and Padilla offer a tantalising vision of
fairness as the hypothetical competitive outcome, thus construing the exercise of
market power as unfair.56 For Gerber, fairness is a buttressing goal: the presence
of unfairness within a transaction acts as an indicator of potential illegal distor-
tion.57 A more radical vision derives from the mooted role of competition law
in tackling inequality.58 A market outcome would thus only be fair if it had pos-
itive or neutral effects on levels of equality, becoming a policy of redistribution
through market transactions. Perhaps the widest reading of the modern fairness
mantra is as a catch-all for socially desirable objectives that conceivably come
within the regulatory ambit of the competition system:59 whether as justifica-
tions for regulatory restraint, or, more contentiously, as drivers for ambitious
intervention.
This study establishes several points. Bare calls to fairness are unilluminat-
ing: there are too many different understandings of what the concept might
mean to direct the substantive task of enforcement. If fair competition is the
goal, then elaboration about what this means—specifically, what it requires of
firms – is necessary. Second, choosing between different conceptions necessar-
ily involves political choices, as to which competing conception of the good
is preferred. The above discussion, brief as it was, demonstrated the breadth
of potential perspectives on fairness from an antitrust standpoint: reciprocity,
consistency, procedural propriety, market opportunity, substantive equity, even
redistribution.While this is not a disqualifying characteristic, the task cannot be
waved away as a technocratic, value-neutral one.A third consideration, implicit
in our discussion, is the difficulty of operationalising fairness as a clear, precise
and certain legal standard upon which to hang the task of enforcement. This is
developed in the fourth section of this article.
The contemporary rhetoric of fairness
This brings us to the expression of fairness within contemporary discourse.
As noted, a key driver of the revived debate is Vestager’s apparently deliberate
55 Motta, n 10 above, 26.
56 C.Ahlborn and A.J.Padilla, ‘From Fairness toWelfare: Implications for the Assessment of Unilat-
eral Conduct under EC Competition Law’ in C.-D. Ehlermann and M.Marquis (eds),European
Competition Law Annual 2007 (Oxford: Hart, 2008).
57 D.J.Gerber, ‘The Future of Article 82:Dissecting the Conflict’ in Ehlermann and Marquis (eds),
ibid.
58 J.B. Baker and S.C. Salop, ‘Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality’ (2015) 104 George-
town L J 1; M. Gal, ‘The Social Contract at the Basis of Competition Law’ in D. Gerard and
I. Lianos (eds), Reconciling Efficiency and Equity: A Global Challenge for Competition Law? (Cam-
bridge:Cambridge University Press, 2019); and most radically, L.Khan and S.Vaheesan, ‘Market
Power and Inequality’ (2017) 11 Harvard Law & Policy Review 235.
59 Consider H. First and S. Weber-Waller, ‘Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit’ (2013) 81 Fordham L
Rev 2543;M.Steinbaum, ‘Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power’ (2019) 82 Law
& Contemporary Problems 45; S. Holmes, ‘Climate change, sustainability, and competition law’
(2020) J Antitrust Enforcement (forthcoming); and D. Srinivasan, ‘The Antitrust Case Against
Facebook,’ (2019) 16 Berkeley Bus L J 39.
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choice to embrace fairness language as she developed an increasingly ambi-
tious vision for competition enforcement.60 What is under-explored is how
this evolved to encompass broader themes of trust in the market and preserv-
ing democracy, also examined below. In our analysis, the Commissioner’s policy
language is augmented by that of her Director-Generals and contrasted with
her predecessors’.We further consider spill-overs into the domain of legislative
rhetoric with the ECN+ Directive, which unexpectedly embraces fairness as
a central concept. The intention is not to offer a quantitative assessment,61 but
rather, by analysing the discourse of fairness, to shine light on this opaque notion
to understand the motivations behind and intentions of this evolution.
Fairness has been a lynchpin of the Commissioner’s policy rhetoric: she in-
voked fairness as a guiding principle for the operation or outcome of market
processes in 85 per cent of speeches in her first term in office.62 (Fairness here is
distinguished from procedural fairness,another important contemporary theme,
albeit beyond the focus of this article.63) The first reference,which occurred in
her second speech, was figurative: to explain why Member States should not
favour national champions,Vestager referred to shifting goalposts to favour one
team, which ‘would not be fair, not much fun, and would be really, really bad
for the sport.’64 In subsequent speeches, the Commissioner articulated more
directly a myriad of ways in which markets might reflect unfairness and thus
merit intervention.
Some references are generic: ‘fair competition culture,’65 ‘fair conditions in
the market,’66 ‘a Europe that gives everyone a fair chance’.67 Others are con-
sistent with consumer welfare: the need to ‘make sure businesses treat people
fairly,’68 that ‘consumers have the power to demand a fair deal,’69 receive ‘fair
access’70 to innovation and see a ‘fair share of the benefits of growth’.71 Yet,
crucially, the Vestager conception of fairness transcends the more economic
approach,with its focus on ends over means.Thus, fairness to market operators
receives equal billing: from ‘the shenanigans of unfair rivals’72 and the need ‘to
preserve fair opportunities in our markets,’73 to sweeping statements regard-
ing the rights of ‘all companies – large and small’ to ‘a fair, fighting chance to
60 Our focus is Commissioner Vestager’s policy speeches, namely remarks in English for public
delivery, not directed solely at specific enforcement cases or the Commission’s legislative role.
All speeches at https://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/.
61 Contrast T.Schrepel, ‘Antitrust Without Romance’ (2020) 13NYU Journal of Law & Liberty 236.
62 111 of 130 policy speeches, or 85.4 per cent, delivered to 29 November 2019. A new Commis-
sion took office in December 2019, and Commissioner Vestager continued her role.This survey
covers her first term.
63 Generally, D.D. Sokol and A.T. Guzman (eds),Antitrust Procedural Fairness (Oxford: OUP, 2019).
64 ‘Thoughts on merger reform and market definition’ Speech, 12 March 2015.
65 ‘EU Competition Law in today’s global economic relations’ Speech, 7 November 2018 (MV
Speech, 7 November 2018).
66 ‘Working together to support fair competition worldwide’ Speech, 3 June 2016.
67 ‘Setting innovation free’ Speech, 12 October 2017 (MV Speech, 12 October 2017).
68 ‘Why global markets need rules’ Speech, 5 August 2017.
69 ‘The future of European values’ Speech, 3 October 2018 (MV Speech, 3 October 2018).
70 ‘Intellectual property and competition’ Speech, 11 September 2015.
71 ‘Competition for a Fairer Society’ Speech, 20 September 2016.
72 ‘Enforcing competition rules in the global village’ Speech, 20 April 2015.
73 ‘On fair markets and gender equality’ Speech, 29 November 2018 (MV Speech, 29 November
2018).
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succeed on their merits,’74 and ‘to compete in our economy’.75 Moreover, the
understanding of what makes a market ‘fair’ exceeds the conventional param-
eters of competition law. The Commissioner thus insists that companies must
pay ‘their fair share of tax,’76 so that ‘everyone makes a fair contribution to
the services that make a decent society’.77 Later speeches raise the issue of ‘fair
pay’78 and protection from ‘unfair working conditions’79 for workers who make
the goods that we consume.Finally,although the Commission long disclaimed a
quasi-regulatory role in competition enforcement,80 Vestager is receptive to the
use of antitrust to secure ‘a fair price,’81 for final consumers and other economic
operators.82
What these examples of unfair – and potentially illegal – conduct lack is a
unitary theme. The vision that emerges encompasses fairness in the process of
competition and in its outcomes. The former, furthermore, evidently goes be-
yond the pursuit of equality of opportunity only for efficient competitors that,
as we shall see, is the hallmark of the more economic approach.83 Accordingly,
fairness cannot be reduced to a ‘level playing field,’ as the Ordos suggested;84
nor securing ‘bang for their buck’ for customers, as consumer welfare advocates
argue;85 nor the ‘capitalist conception of justice’ that follows from maximising
total welfare, as the Chicago School contended.86 Fairness, by implication, is
more fundamental and all-encompassing. Yet this creates potential for overlaps
and tensions: between fair prices for consumers and fair wages for workers, or
fair opportunities for entrants and fair rewards for incumbents. Thus Director-
General Laitenberger’s claim that fairness is ‘a call to rigour,coherence and con-
sistency’87 is unconvincing; although he clarified that fairness, in the antitrust
sense, is distinguishable from inequitable behaviour under the unfair trading
rules, insofar as it implies restrictions on competition as such.88
74 ‘Perspectives on Europe’ Speech, 20 November 2015.
75 MV Speech, 3 October 2018, n 69 above.
76 ‘Independence is non-negotiable’Speech,18 June 2015;also ‘Helping people cope with techno-
logical change’ Speech, 21 November 2017; ‘Competition and a fair deal for consumers online’
Speech 26 April 2018; ‘Protecting consumers in a digital world’ Speech, 4 December 2018 (MV
Speech,4 December 2018); ‘An innovative digital future’Speech,8 February 2018;and ‘A digital
future that works for Europeans’ Speech, 27 August 2019 (MV Speech, 27 August 2019).
77 MV Speech, 12 October 2017, n 67 above.
78 ‘Building a fairer and more sustainable economy’ Speech, 19 September 2018; also ‘Making
fashion sustainable’ Speech, 15 May 2018.
79 ‘An innovative digital future’ Speech, 8 February 2019 (MV Speech, 8 February 2019); also ‘The
champions Europe needs’ Speech, 9 January 2019 (MV Speech, 9 January 2019).
80 n 161 below.
81 ‘How competition supports innovation’ Speech, 24 May 2016.
82 ‘Protecting consumers from exploitation’ Speech, 21 November 2016 (MV Speech, 21
November 2016).
83 See C-280/08P Deutsche Telekom EU:C:2010:603, endorsing ‘as-efficient competitor’ test for
margin squeeze; and C-413/14P Intel EU:C:2017:632 at [139], which linked the permissibility
of exclusive dealing to whether such practices ‘exclude competitors that are at least as-efficient
as the dominant undertaking’.
84 n 53 above.
85 H. Hovenkamp, ‘Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperilled?’ (2018) Institute for Law
& Economics Research Paper No 18-15.
86 R.A. Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (1979) 8 J Legal Studies 103, 136.
87 JL Speech, 10 October 2017, n 4 above.
88 ibid.
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Gradually,moreover,a more ambitious overarchingmessage emerged:namely,
market fairness as a gateway to societal fairness: ‘[I]f we value an open economy,
and a liberal society, we have to show that those values benefit everyone … if
we want to show that our society treats everyone fairly,… we need to prove it
in the market.’89
The not-unreasonable rationale is that ‘people don’t think about politics all
the time. But they do deal with the market every single day.’90 The crux of the
concern is a matter of perception: that ordinary people experience the world as
an unfair place. By implication, competition enforcement against large power-
ful companies helps to redress this perceived imbalance,91 even if the evidence
that antitrust can address problems like inequality or the democratic deficit is
limited.92 Laitenberger portrayed this as a duty of the Commission, linked to a
general expectation that ‘public institutions … serve the broader purpose of a
fairer and more inclusive society’.93 Vestager herself spoke of the ‘responsibility
to the public’ of enforcers,94 eventually positioning fairness as one of the EU’s
‘basic values’.95
Vestager was thus bullish about embracing fairness as the guiding principle
for enforcement.96 Yet in doing so, she sought to curtail the radicality of her
message in two dimensions. First, referencing its Treaty bases, she argued that
‘the concept of fairness … is as old as the competition rules themselves.’97 Even
if explicit discussion of fairness had long been absent, the concept was dormant
rather than non-existent.Laitenberger spoke of the ‘revival’of fairness discourse,
rather than its reinvention,98 while his successor, Director-General Madero
Villarejo, described the Commissioner’s ‘references to the full implications of
competition policy.’99 Second, embracing fairness as the lodestar of contempo-
rary enforcement is not considered to necessitate replacing ‘the whole system
89 ‘Competition and the Digital Single Market’ Speech, 15 September 2016.
90 ‘Defending competition throughout the EU’ Speech, 23 November 2016; also ‘Meeting the
challenges of globalisation together’ Speech, 10 May 2017; ‘Fighting for European values in a
time of change’Speech,14 June 2017; and ‘Competition in changing times’Speech,16 February
2018.
91 ‘Competition policy in context’ Speech, 1 December 2016.
92 On inequality, D.A. Crane, ‘Antitrust and Wealth Inequality’ (2016) 101 Cornell L Review
1171; on democracy, N. Petersen, ‘Antitrust Law and the Promotion of Democracy and Eco-
nomic Growth’ (2013) 9 JCLE 593; and T.C.Ma, ‘Antitrust and Democracy: Perspectives from
Efficiency and Equity’ (2016) 12 JCLE 233.Vigorous targeted application of the existing frame-
work may deliver collateral benefits: Baker and Salop, n 58 above; S. Ennis et al, Inequality: A
hidden cost of market power OECD 2017 at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/inequality-
a-hidden-cost-of-market-power.htm; and J.Kwoka,Mergers,Merger Control and Remedies (Cam-
bridge,MA:MIT Press, 2015).
93 ‘Striking the right balance in the enforcement of competition rules’ Speech,20 September 2017.
94 MV Speech, 21 November 2016, n 82 above.
95 ‘Leadership in a changing world’ Speech, 12 November 2019; similarly, ‘Building a positive
digital world’ Speech, 29 October 2019.
96 ‘[C]ompetition … does help to make our markets work more fairly … we shouldn’t be ashamed
to say that.’ ‘Fair markets in a digital world’ Speech, 9 March 2018 (MV Speech, 9 March 2018).
97 MV Speech, 22 November 2018, n 11 above; language echoed in JL Speech, 10 October 2017,
n 4 above.
98 ‘Fairness in EU competition law enforcement’ Speech, 20 June 2018.
99 ‘The legacy of Commissioner Vestager and a peek into the future’ Speech, 12 November 2019
(emphasis added).
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of rules that lawyers and economists have developed over two generations.’100
That is, crucially, fairness is not, from this viewpoint, incompatible with the
otherwise ascendant more economic approach. Laitenberger, indeed, used the
fairness debate to assert that the more economic approach does not, in the EU,
translate into an exclusive focus on short-term price effects, but considers, inter
alia, harm to structural competition and innovation.101 At most, then, the fair-
ness revival represents an evolution, but not a revolution, in competition law.
The soundness of this contention is considered in the fourth section.
This raises an important question, however, namely the extent to which
the Commissioner’s focus distinguishes her from predecessors in the role. The
language of fairness was by no means absent from the policy pronounce-
ments of Vestager’s immediate predecessors in the ‘modernised’ era: Joaquin
Almunia, Neelie Kroes and Mario Monti.102 There are marked differences,
however,between Vestager’s usage of fairness and that of earlier Commissioners.
First, fairness is a more consistent theme for Vestager: Almunia103 and
Kroes104 made reference to market fairness in half of their policy speeches,
and it arose in less than a third delivered by Monti.105 Earlier allusions, sec-
ondly, tended to be brief, perfunctory and somewhat trite, with little effort to
expound upon what fairness meant or why it mattered. Almunia frequently
spoke of competition law’s mission to ‘keep markets open and fair’.106 Kroes
made recurrent references to ‘free and fair’ competition,107 and maintaining ‘a
fair level playing field’108.Monti rarely went far beyond basic mentions of ‘fair
competition’109.Thus even if the language of fairness was present, it was neither
prioritised nor given substantive content. Third, references in earlier discourse
100 MV Speech, 9 March 2018, n 96 above.
101 JL Speech, 10 October 2017, n 4 above.
102 Commissioner Almunia held office from 2009 to 2014; Commissioner Kroes held office from
2004 to 2009; and Commissioner Monti held office from 1999 to 2004.
103 71 of 130 speeches, or 54.61 per cent. Figures for earlier Commissioners include only speeches
available in English, and exclude statements about specific cases or legislative developments, and
speeches discussing procedural fairness or where the word ‘fair’ arises in phrases like ‘it is fair to
say’. All at https://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/.
104 75 of 142 speeches, or 52.82 per cent.
105 26 of 84 speeches, or 30.95 per cent.
106 ‘Competition policy as a pan-European effort’ Speech, 2 October 2012; ‘Competition, innova-
tion and growth: an EU perspective on the challenges ahead’ Speech, 21 November 2013; and
‘Competition policy and the global economy’ Speech, 7 March 2014.
107 ‘Reforming Europe’s state aid regime: An action plan for change’ Speech, 14 June 2005; ‘One
year in:Continuity,concentration and consolidation in European competition policy’Speech,21
October 2005; ‘Market developments and future perspectives in the automotive sector’ Speech,
25 September 2006; ‘Helping Europeans get the best deal: a sound competition policy for well-
functioning markets’ Speech, 15 November 2007;
108 ‘The competition principle as a guidelines for legislation and state action’ Speech, 6 June 2005;
‘Speech by Commissioner Kroes before the Korean Competition Forum’ Speech, 26 June 2006;
‘Competition policy in a Lisbon context – the State of Play’ Speech, 6 July 2006; and ‘Closing
remarks at roundtable to discuss future of the Car Block exemption’ Speech, 9 February 2009.
109 ‘Contribution of competition policy to competitiveness of European business’ Speech, 26 May
2003; ‘Intervening against government restraints on competition: reflections from the EU exper-
tise’ Speech, 27 October 2003; ‘Recent developments in European air transport law and policy’
Speech, 6 November 2003; ‘New developments in state aid policy’ Speech, 1 December 2003;
and ‘State aid enforcement in context: competitiveness, economic reforms and enlargement’
Speech, 27 April 2004.
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demonstrated a different sensibility.Almunia repeatedly emphasised the entitle-
ment of patent-holders and suppliers to fair compensation,110 and the unfairness
to other market participants that followed from state subsidies or public owner-
ship.111 Notably, the most in-depth discussion in the policy statements of Kroes
involved the Commissioner rejecting the contention that fairness plays a role
under Article 102, instead arguing that ‘competition policy evolves as our un-
derstanding of economics evolves.’112 The thinness of fairness discourse within
the rhetoric of Monti is consistent with his positioning as ‘the reformer,’113
during a period which considerations of substantive fairness took a backseat
to procedural fairness and greater rigour in economic assessment. Accordingly,
while looking backwards supports the contention that fairness is not a novel
consideration,114 this fails to recognise the more expansive, pervasive nature of
its contemporary iteration.
Critical attention focuses on Vestager’s overarching claims of fairness. Yet
gradually the rhetoric of fairness embraced two further themes: trust and
democracy. It is hardly coincidental that the first, public trust in market-based
institutions, emerged in the first speech that Vestager gave after the Brexit vote
in June 2016, where she argued:
[I]t’s not enough anymore for business and government to simply ask people to
trust them … We now need to show people that the system is fair. [C]ompetition
enforcement can help to deal with the biggest concerns that Europeans face …
because it helps to make sure the system works fairly.115
From this perspective, competition law serves not only the individualist goal
of correcting discrete market failures; it also addresses overarching concerns
that the social market economy as such has failed. Laitenberger similarly made
repeated reference to fears among ordinary citizens that ‘the game is some-
how rigged’.116 Addressing this concern is of equal if not greater importance
110 ‘SGEI reform and the application of competition rules to the financial sector: themes for di-
alogue with the European Parliament’ Speech, 22 March 2011; ‘Looking back at five years of
competition enforcement in the EU’ Speech, 10 September 2014; and ‘Some highlights from
EU competition enforcement’ Speech, 19 September 2014.
111 ‘Staying ahead of the curve in EU competition policy’ Speech, 19 April 2011; ‘An integrated
approach to State aid’ Speech, 26 May 2011; ‘International cooperation to fight protectionism’
Speech,18 April 2013; ‘Europe’s banking sector after the crisis:Oversight, regulation and respon-
sibility’ Speech, 10 May 2013; ‘Competition enforcement in the EU: Beyond the integration of
Markets’ Speech, 18 October 2013; and ‘Banks in distress and Europe’s competition regime:On
the road to the Banking Union’ Speech, 25 September 2014.
112 ‘Preliminary thoughts on policy review of Article 82’ Speech, 23 September 2005 (NK Speech,
23 September 2005).
113 ‘Competition enforcement reforms in the EU’ Speech, 4 April 2003.
114 n 97 above.
115 ‘EESC Plenary Thursday 14 July’ Speech, 14 July 2016.
116 ‘Restoring confidence in a world in flux: The contribution of competition policy and enforce-
ment’ Speech, 26 February 2017 (JL Speech, 26 February 2017); also ‘Remarks delivered at a
panel discussion organised by the EU Delegation to Canada on the occasion of the 60th anniver-
sary of the Treaties of Rome’ Speech, 27 March 2017 (JL Speech, 27 March 2017); JL Speech,
10 October 2017, n 4 above; and Enforcing EU competition law in a time of change’ Speech, 1
March 2018.
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because, per Vestager, public trust is ‘the most important currency our societies
have’.117
The concept of trust, in Vestager’s rendering, has two dimensions, both of
which are augmented by competition enforcement. First, the public lack trust
in society as a whole, in particular the state institutions that underpin the so-
cial market economy.118 Thus, ‘when people feel cheated by the market, they
very easily lose trust in their whole society’.119 Second, the public lack trust in
private actors,120 like technology companies that access personal data,121 em-
ploy algorithmic decision-making,122 or avoid tax.123 Laitenberger, additionally,
was candid in identifying a third focus of public scepticism, ‘specialists’124 and
‘experts,’125 defined as ‘including the legal and economic professions’126 that
comprise the backbone of most competition agencies. (This concern was, in-
famously, also raised in Brexit debates.127) This variety of mistrust is arguably
of acute concern to competition authorities like the Commission, insofar as
it questions their authority to engage in enforcement activities. Moreover, it
provides a rationale for aggressive and very public enforcement to counter the
narrative of a technocratic agency disconnected from public concerns – an issue
revisited in the fifth section below.
A third theme is the role of competition law in promoting democracy, an-
other ‘basic value’.128 This concern links largely to the digital economy,129 and
the attendant influence of digital platforms ‘[o]ver our daily lives, and even over
the way our democracy works.’130 Like fairness, the emphasis is subjective, re-
lated to the ordinary citizen-consumer’s perceptions: ‘Democracy has always
been about feelings, as well as reason.’131 At times, this debate has a paternalistic
character: antitrust intervenes to ensure that otherwise-efficient transactions do
117 ‘How competition can build trust in our societies’ Speech, 21 September 2017 (MV Speech, 21
September 2017).
118 ‘To win people’s trust,we have to take action that makes a difference to their lives’:MV Speech,
20 September 2016, n 71 above; also ‘Making markets deliver essential medicines’ Speech, 20
August 2018;MV Speech, 9 January 2019, n 79 above.
119 ‘Fairness and Competition’ Speech, 25 January 2018.
120 MV Speech, 21 September 2017, n 117 above; ‘A responsibility to be fair’ Speech, 3 September
2018; ‘Building a fairer digital world’ Speech, 7 November 2018 (MV Speech, 7 November
2018); ‘Defending trust and openness in the digital age’ Speech, 12 November 2018; and MV
Speech, 4 December 2018, n 76 above.
121 ‘Making data work for us’ Speech, 9 September 2016; and MV Speech, 12 October 2017, n 67
above.
122 ‘Clearing the path for innovation’ Speech, 7 November 2017.
123 ‘For a fair taxation system in Europe’ Speech, 28 November 2017, and ‘Working together for
fair taxation’ Speech, 2 September 2016.
124 JL Speech, 27 March 2017, n 116 above.
125 JL Speech, 26 February 2017, n 116 above.
126 ibid.
127 ‘Britain has had enough of experts, says Gove’ Financial Times 3 June 2016.
128 n 95 above.
129 ‘When technology serves people’ Speech, 1 June 2018; MV Speech, 7 November 2018, n 120
above; MV Speech 4 December 2018, n 76 above; and ‘Dealing with power in a brave new
world: economy, technology and human rights’ Speech, 19 March 2019 (MV Speech, 19 March
2019).
130 ‘Competition and the future of Europe’ Speech, 17 December 2017.
131 ‘Getting the best out of Europe’ Speech, 25 January 2019 (MV Speech, 25 January 2019).
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not generate excessive non-economic societal costs.132 Competition policy is
accordingly repurposed as a tool to enable market participation, which leads
to greater feelings of empowerment among citizens and, eventually, builds soci-
ety.133 Issues raised include algorithmic decision-making,134 data privacy,135 and
the shift from public to private economic control.136 Laitenberger even drew
links to fake news,hate speech and ‘echo chambers,’ although without expressly
claiming that competition enforcement addresses such problems.137
Thus far,our discussion has considered policy statements of representatives of
DG Competition.Yet it is worth considering what looks like a drafting quirk of
the ECN+ Directive to understand how the rhetoric of fairness finds concrete
legislative expression.138 When the Directive was proposed,139 its draft recitals
referenced ‘open competitive markets’ as the objective of competition enforce-
ment.By its adoption, this language changed pointedly to ‘fairer and more open
competitive markets’ in recital (1), and to ‘fairer competitive markets’ in recital
(6). On one level, these revisions are inconsequential, as the Directive is un-
concerned with the substance of antitrust. Yet this shift is more important than
it appears. An easy objection to discussion of fairness as a rhetorical concept
is that, whatever the frequency of such references, they are mere puff without
legal significance. Conversely, the ECN+ Directive provides an unambiguous
legal statement of the centrality of fairness to contemporary enforcement. In-
deed, the Directive necessarily reflects wider EU-level acceptance of fairness as
the changes were introduced during the legislative process. Even if the recitals
lack substantive bite, they nonetheless add to the formal corpus of competition
law which provides textual support for fairness as a motivating principle.
In sum, the fairness mantra as developed in recent discourse is wide-ranging
and occasionally inconsistent. Rather than resolving the open questions and
overlapping claims identified above, it embraces a multitude of perspectives and
deserving recipients of ‘fair’ treatment. Notably, it positions competition law
as a regulatory tool that goes beyond the technical task of remedying discrete
market failures, instead laying claim to a range of targets that extend to the
core of modern liberal democracy.While its most ambitious claims are rhetor-
ical, the ECN+ Directive provides evidence that fairness is back on the formal
competition policy agenda.
132 ‘Making the data revolution work for us’ Speech, 4 February 2019.
133 ‘Playing by the rules in a globalised world’ Speech, 20 July 2018 (MV Speech, 20 July 2018).
134 ‘Bundeskartellamt 18th Conference on Competition, Berlin’ Speech, 16 March 2017.
135 MV Speech, 20 July 2018, n 133 above.
136 MV Speech, 19 March 2019, n 129 above.
137 ‘Accuracy and administrability go hand in hand’ Speech, 12 December 2017.
138 Directive 2019/1 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more
effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market (OJ L11/3, 14
January 2019).
139 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive to empower the competition authorities of the Mem-
ber States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market
COM(2017)142.
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Rise and fall of the ‘more economic approach’
If fairness has the advantage and curse of being an expansive morally infused no-
tion, economic efficiency may be its perfect foil. Efficiency, otherwise known
as wealth maximisation, measures an industry’s performance of its economic
task in society’s interest.140 It is considered a particularly apt metric in the
antitrust context insofar as well-functioning markets – nominally the objec-
tive of any competition system – deliver an efficient allocation of resources.
While few competition scholars today advocate for an unadulterated efficiency-
maximisation standard without consideration of distributional consequences,an
approach to enforcement that deliberately neglects efficiency considerations is
more difficult to defend.
It was this recognition, among other factors,141 that prompted the Commis-
sion to move towards the more economic approach from the early 2000s. Its
general thrust was described by CommissionerMonti as a shift ‘from a legalistic-
based approach to an interpretation of the rules based on sound economic
principles.’142 Developed progressively in the areas of agreements, mergers and
dominance, the more economic approach comprises several key themes.First, it
sets an overarching objective of tackling ‘anticompetitive foreclosure,’ defined
as exclusion of competitors that generates harmful effects for consumers.143
Thus exclusion is no longer the focus, but only where this affects efficient
sources of competition.Second, the Commission committed to rigorous, robust
methodologies to determine anticompetitive harm.144 Third, it signalled greater
receptiveness towards countervailing efficiencies which arise concurrently with
restrictive behaviour.145 Thus the more economic approach aligns with the
broadly (though not unconditionally) accepted understanding of competition
law as a ‘consumer welfare prescription’.146 The revised approach did not pur-
port to override the plurality of objectives long-recognised in EU law, such as
market integration.147 But it did suggest that the primary focus of the rules and
their enforcement, in future,was to ensure efficient operation of markets in the
consumer interest.
The movement towards an effects-based, economics-imbued approach was
not aimed in direct opposition to fairness-minded concerns. Indeed, the more
economic approach is consistent with a fairness rationale insofar as a focus on
140 W.K. Viscusi et al,Economics of Regulation and Antitrust (Cambridge,MA:MIT Press, 2005) 79.
141 Witt, n 19 above, ch 1.
142 ‘EU competition policy after May 2004’ Speech, 24 October 2003.
143 European Commission,Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers (OJ C265/6,18Octo-
ber 2008) (Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines) para 18;Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertak-
ings (OJ C45/7, 24 February 2009), (Enforcement Priorities) para 19; and Guidelines on Vertical
Restraints (OJ C130/1, 19 May 2010) para 100.
144 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, ibid, para 32, and Enforcement Priorities, ibid, paras 23-27.
145 European Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty (OJ C101/97)
(Art 81(3) Guidelines); Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers (OJ C31/5, 5 February
2004) paras 76-88; and Enforcement Priorities, n 43 above, paras 28-31.
146 So described by the US Supreme Court in Reiter v Sonotone Corp 442 US 330 (1979), 343.
147 See for example C-56/64 Consten and Grundig EU:C:1966:41 (Consten); C-439/09 Pierre Fabre
EU:C:2011:649; and AT.40134 – AB Inbev Decision of 13 May 2019.
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efficiency can deliver, inter alia, basic necessities like food and medicine at lower
prices, increasing their availability for the most vulnerable.148 Yet the almost re-
actionary rejection of market power in certain iterations of fairness sets it on a
collision course with the more economic approach, under which even signifi-
cant market power is not necessarily objectionable if exercised in a manner that
benefits consumers. Thus the concept of ‘fair competition’ as anything other
than a proxy for ‘effective competition’ within ‘open and competitive’markets
was gradually expunged from the antitrust lexicon.149
Yet efficiency is a somewhat underwhelming value,arguably,raising questions
as to why the competition community turned its back on fairness so decisively.
Despite its intuitive attractiveness, there are several reasons why a fairness stan-
dard is at odds with a ‘modernised’ competition framework.
The first has been noted, but bears reiterating: the absence of an established
definition of fairness in EU law. The third section above illustrated the variety
of approaches both within the literature and arising in current discourse.With-
out a clear baseline for intervention, fairness is criticised as an equivocal and
unstable basis for antitrust enforcement.150 While the absence of an authorita-
tive definition within the Treaty is not unusual, what is more surprising is the
failure of the Court of Justice to articulate a coherent vision,particularly in light
of its tendency to favour teleological approaches to interpretation. Indeed, on
those occasions in which the Court has considered the meaning of fairness in
discrete instances, it generally favours a conservative understanding that aligns
readily with the more economic approach.
The ‘fair share’of benefits that must accrue to consumers for successful appli-
cation of Article 101(3), for instance, is interpreted in terms of the allocation of
efficiency gains.151 The exception rule associates fairness with the maximisation
of overall consumer surplus,152 rather than any more profound interpretation.
The reference to ‘unfair’ prices in Article 102 is similarly interpreted in es-
sentially economic terms. Following the language of Article 102(a), the Court
accepts that exploitatively high prices might be abusive, but attempts to set an
objective, economics-oriented standard to measure excessiveness: namely, that
price must bear ‘no reasonable relation to the economic value of the prod-
uct’.153 Unfairly low prices are typically assessed by reference to their exclu-
sionary effect under Article 102(b). Here too, the Court adopts a demanding,
economics-focused approach,mapping the acceptability of low prices onto the
relationship between the defendant’s own costs and revenues.154 While margin
148 See for example C.R. Leslie, ‘Antitrust as Public Interest Law’ (2012) 2 UC Irvine L Rev 884,
and H.J. Hovenkamp, ‘Progressive Antitrust’ (2017) U Penn Institute for Law and Economics
Research Paper No 17-25.
149 Art 81(3) Guidelines, n 145 above, para 47; and regarding Art 102, NK Speech, 23 September
2005, n 112 above.
150 A critical treatment is M. Dolmans and W. Lin, ‘Fairness and Competition Law: A Fairness
Paradox’ Concurrences No 4-2017; a more ambivalent account emphasising the ambiguity of
fairness is Ayal, n 47 above.
151 This is clear since Consten n 147 above, 348; also Art 81(3) Guidelines, n 145 above, paras 33 and
85.
152 C-238/05 Asnef-Equifax EU:C:2006:734 at [70].
153 C-27/76 United Brands EU:C:1978:22 at [250].
154 C-62/86 AKZO EU:C:1991:286; reaffirmed C-202/07P France Télécom EU:C:2009:214.
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squeeze is framed in fairness-oriented terms, relating to the ‘unfairness of the
spread’ between wholesale and retail prices, this is measured by reference to
exclusionary effects on efficient competitors.155 Although price discrimination
appears inherently unfair,156 moreover, the mere existence of price differentials
is not abusive, but instead evidence of exclusion of efficient rivals157 or specific
competitive disadvantage158 is required.
Accordingly, the conventional understanding of fairness as interpreted in the
jurisprudence maps more or less onto the substantive content of the econom-
ically oriented competition rules, with little independent existence besides as
a synonym for welfare-maximising behaviour.While this is not to suggest that
the Court has never endorsed fairness-based reasoning, it is reluctant to do so in
so many words. Accordingly, even if fairness is ‘as old as the competition rules
themselves,’159 the absence of a clear and functional definition limits its utility.
A second difficulty is that, even assuming that a single definition of
fairness – as distinct from efficiency – could be agreed, it is difficult to con-
ceive of one which would not require significant trade-offs. As our discussion
above illustrated, fairness is not necessarily a zero-sum game: but in the context
of market competition, it is rare that everybody considers themselves a winner.
A high retail price may be viewed as unfair by individual consumers who must
pay the elevated price or do without. But high prices are more reasonable –
rather fairer – when considered from the perspective of suppliers seeking an ad-
equate return on investment, or the supplier’s workforce pursuing fair wages, or
would-be rivals hoping to enter the market with competitive offerings, or the
exchequer where excess profits are taxed appropriately – or even the customer
herself, where high prices are designed to discourage harmful consumption.
More complex trade-offs arise in contemporary markets. Is it, for example,
unfair for consumers to be required, perhaps unknowingly, to provide large
quantities of personal data, in order knowingly to access a valuable free-to-use
service like a social network or search engine? Or are the significant positions
of economic strength held by the tech giants unfair in themselves, even if these
reflect years of investment, innovation and competition on the merits? A ‘fair-
ness paradox’ is accordingly identified, insofar as appeals to fairness can be made
by many sides in a debate.160
Translating these trade-offs into the context of a law enforcement exercise –
as antitrust entails – reveals the complexity. To the extent that the prefer-
ences of one group are favoured, this unavoidably involves ‘picking win-
ners,’ an essentially political role that most competition authorities actively
disclaim.161 Indeed,even among those who argue for greater space for fairness in
155 Deutsche Telekom n 83 above at [167].
156 A contemporary discussion is C.Townley,E.Morrison and K.Yeung, ‘Big Data and Personalized
Price Discrimination in EU Competition Law’ (2017) 36 YEL 683.
157 C-209/10 Post Danmark EU:C:2012:172.
158 C-295/17 MEO EU:C:2018:942 at [26]-[28].
159 n 97 above.
160 Dolmans and Lin, n 150 above, para 9.
161 ‘[T]he Commission is not and does not wish to act as a price regulator’: European Commission,
XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy (1997) 29; also Speech of Maureen Ohlhausen, Acting
Chairman FTC, ‘Antitrust Enforcement in the Digital’ 12 September 2017.
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contemporary antitrust, there is wariness about whether agencies are equipped
to make such judgment calls.162 It may, moreover, be difficult to articulate a
clear and coherent threshold for intervention ex ante, or develop robust con-
sistent methodologies for assessing unfair behaviour ex post. Such imprecision
raises issues of legal certainty for defendants – a problem that can itself be con-
strued in ‘fairness’ terms – and of deterrence, insofar as the exhortation, ‘don’t
be unfair,’ has limited instructive value.
A third concern relates to the nature of the competition process. Competi-
tive markets are not necessarily ‘fair’ places, as the term is conventionally under-
stood.163 Exclusion of less effective competitors is hardwired into the market
mechanism,164 while the motto of caveat emptor – while constrained by contract
and consumer protection laws, and sector regulation – hints at an innate oppo-
sition between consumer and producer interests. To put the point bluntly, if a
fairer world overall is the ultimate goal, why is competition law the instrument
of choice? (‘Because it’s there’ is, perhaps, the implicit response – a point con-
sidered below.) Otherwise, to set fairness as the standard for intervention either
requires a narrow technical understanding of the concept, as has been the case
to date, or risks taking the role of competition law from one of buttressing the
market to supplanting it entirely.
Accordingly, fairness is arguably an inapt metric where the task is that of
market regulation and the chosen instrument involves individual instances of
enforcement against defaulting companies. The fundamental objection in the
antitrust context is not that fairness is an inappropriate goal for courts, regu-
lators or any system of law to pursue. Rather, the concern is the disjuncture
between any meaningful conception of fairness and the narrower range of out-
comes that application of the competition rules can hope to achieve, effectively
and legitimately.165 Societal fairness is a compelling and urgent goal in today’s
unequal and polarised world, one which ‘confers a rhetorical flourish and in-
trinsic righteousness’.166 Yet its content remains disputed and elusive,making it
an inopportune basis from which to attack the fundamental freedom to con-
duct a business which prevails even in the vaunted social market economy.167
As progressive critics emphasise, moreover, intervening to tame market power
for its own sake can have the perverse outcome of harming the most vulnerable
most immediately by raising prices.168 From this perspective, fairness contrasts
with efficiency. While the legitimacy of directing an entire field of law solely
towards the pursuit of this technical concept has repeatedly and rightly been
challenged,169 efficiency has numerous advantages from a regulatory perspec-
tive.170 It is definable, it is measurable, and enhancing efficiency generates an
162 F. Jenny, ‘Populism, fairness and competition’ (2019) 70 Japanese Economic Review 280.
163 T.J. Brennan, ‘Should Antitrust Go Beyond “Antitrust”?’ (2018) 63 Antitrust Bulletin 49, 55.
164 Recognised in Post Danmark n 157 above at [21], and Intel n 83 above at [133].
165 Offering an emphatic counterargument, I. Lianos, ‘The Poverty of Competition Law’ CLES
Research Paper Series 2/2018.
166 Dolmans and Lin, n 150 above, para 15.
167 Protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Art 16.
168 Hovenkamp, n 85 above, 37.
169 See Fox,n 20 above, and B.Y.Orbach, ‘The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox’ (2011) 7 JCLE
133.
170 For this reason, endorsed by, for example,Motta, n 10 above.
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unambiguous public benefit (it enhances the size of the pie available to all),
even if subsequent questions of equity deserve equal attention, whether from
antitrust enforcers or other policymakers.
And yet – the siren call of fairness in an era of market scepticism has not gone
unheard. Despite its two-decades-old commitment to a more objective, rigor-
ous approach, much of recent Commission enforcement activity reveals only
the most limited influence of its ostensible guiding principles. Below we con-
sider examples from current practice which diverge from the scientism of the
more economic approach, and thus align with one or more visions of fair com-
petition.171 Two caveat are necessary. First, the claim is not that fairness has or
will displace all that has gone before in competition law.The argument is simply
that, in shaping the evolution of the antitrust rules in areas of policy salience,
the pursuit of fairness provides inspiration and impetus. Second, consistent with
our observations about the absence of an authoritative definition of fairness and
the multitude of perspectives in recent discourse, no single understanding is ad-
vocated. Instead, we consider examples which cover a range of fairness-based
perspectives, from fairness of opportunity for individual operators, to fairness in
terms of the equity of societal outcomes, to a technical conception of fairness
as anything other than the prescriptions of the more economic approach.
A Very Public Attack on ‘Big Tech’
We start with the most prominent theme of enforcement during Vestager’s
first term in office, namely an explicit and unequivocal focus on regulating
‘Big Tech’. It was noted above, in the third section, that contemporary fairness
discourse discloses a particular concern with the digital economy, in terms of
both market power and wider societal implications. This is matched by a focus
on digital issues, in day-to-day enforcement and bigger-picture policy planning.
On the enforcement side, Commission activity in the digital economy en-
compasses Article 101,Article 102 and the State Aid rules.As we shall see, some
of this practice is marked by a notable departure from the proposed method-
ology of the more economic approach, whether the impugned behaviour is
novel or not so novel in nature. Taken together, the most obvious aspect is the
very public demonstrative function that follows from using competition law
to challenge the largely-unimpeded market freedom of ‘tech giants’. Arguably
the clearest manifestation is the record-breaking fines imposed in the Google
cases under Article 102,172 the largest of which,Android, conveniently rounded-
up to USD$5 billion when reported.173 Similarly, it was reflected in the
headline-grabbing figure of €13 billion which Apple was required to repay for
171 The reference period is Commissioner Vestager’s first term in office (November 2014-2019).
We exclude cartel enforcement, which falls outside the scope of the more economic approach.
172 AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping) Decision of 27 July 2017 (Shopping), saw a fine of €2.42
billion, double the largest under Art 102 previously. That was eclipsed by a penalty of €4.34
billion in AT.40099 – Google Android Decision of 18 July 2018 (Android). The fine of €1.49
billion for AT.40411 –Google Search (AdSense)Decision of 20 March 2019 (AdSense),was almost
anticlimactic.
173 See for example ‘Why Did the European Commission Fine Google Five Billion Dollars?’ The
New Yorker 20 July 2018.
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uncollected taxes that allegedly violated the State Aid rules, a decision described
by Apple’s CEO as ‘total political crap’.174 It is further evident in the choice
to pursue the Google cases as infringement rather than commitment decisions
– the latter having been the preferred option prior to Vestager’s arrival at DG
Competition.175 These widely-reported financial penalties and unambiguous
findings of breach send a clear message: even if technology companies seem
all-powerful, this can be tamed by the EU in the public interest.
This links evidently to several concerns explored earlier, in particular high
levels of public mistrust in the technology companies that increasingly appear
to control daily life, and a perceived need to promote democracy through en-
forcement.Of course, the actual subject-matter of these decisions is far removed
from the most acute public concerns about the digital economy. But the cases
demonstrate that the EU can and will confront, and may essentially regulate,
unacceptable behaviour by otherwise-unassailable technology companies. The
fairness mantra is accordingly reflected in the decision to prioritise and pur-
sue in such a defiantly and purposefully high-profile manner these cases,which
chimes with the bold claim that enforcement helps to make the modern world
a better place.
This ethos is similarly evident in policy efforts to shape the evolution of
competition law in light of challenges posed by the digital economy. Specifi-
cally, the Commission’s expert report on Competition Policy for the Digital Era
presents an ambitious, provocative vision for pro-active enforcement going
forward.176 Again, the focus on Big Tech is striking, not least because the ‘new
economy’ is no longer so new.177 As above, it chimes with public sentiment
regarding the need for greater oversight of the increasingly-powerful digital
economy. Yet many of the individual recommendations also reflect a notable
step back from the rigour (or, perhaps, restrictiveness) of the more economic
approach, in favour of a looser,more holistic assessment that coincides with the
expansive fairness criterion within Vestager’s policy rhetoric.These include de-
liberate departure from the consumer welfare standard in certain instances;178
rejection of error-cost analysis by erring on the side of prohibiting potentially
anticompetitive conduct in digital markets;179 and reverse burdens of proof for
dominant platforms that must demonstrate an absence of anticompetitive effects
from their behaviour.180 Although eschewing direct references to fairness, the
approach is consistent with the flexible,multi-polar vision that the fairness stan-
dard suggests.The motivation for the report’s innovations is similarly aligned: an
174 ‘“Total political crap”: Tim Cook on the Apple tax verdict’ Financial Times 1 September 2016.
175 In Shopping n 172 above, the Commission went through three rounds of (ultimately unsuccess-
ful) market-testing before switching to the infringement procedure (at [76]). In Android n 172
above, although the defendant offered commitments, the Commission either considered these
inadequate or the claimed infringement so serious as to rule out Art 9 (at [32]).
176 European Commission, Competition Policy for the Digital Era. A report by Jacques Crémer, Yves-
Alexandre de Montjoye & Heike Schweitzer (Brussels: European Commission, 2019) (Competition
Policy for the Digital Era).
177 Also querying the report’s timing, ‘Editorial Comments: Special Advice on Competition Policy
for the Digital Era’ (2020) 57 CMLRev 315, 315-316.
178 Competition Policy for the Digital Era n 176 above, 40-41.
179 ibid, 50-52.
180 ibid, 66-67.
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awareness that ‘the influence of [tech firms] is not only economic but extends
to social and political issues.’181
Yet the epithet of fair competition impacts not only the high-level mes-
sage of enforcement, but also the day-to-day activity of applying the rules in
practice. In one sense, the (re)embracing of fairness inevitably represents an
implicit rejection of the more economic approach, despite somewhat feeble ef-
forts to reconcile these currents of thought.182 In filling the analytical gaps that
result, moreover, certain ideas familiar from contemporary fairness discourse
are prominent, suggesting that fairness in substance requires more than simply
moving beyond efficiency maximisation.
Article 102 and the ‘Fair Chance to Succeed’
It was argued above that a prominent symbol of the Commission’s renewed
fairness-based crusade are the staggeringly high fines imposed for Article 102
violations by one of today’s largest digital companies, Google. These cases are
noteworthy not only for the punishment imposed, however, but also for the
underlying theories of harm. Our focus is Shopping and Android,183 both of
which are under appeal.184
Shopping addressed what is known as self-preferencing, referring to situations
whereby digital platforms give ‘preferential treatment to one’s own products or
services when they are in competition with products and services provided by
other entities using the platform.’185 This is clearly a question of fairness from a
market opportunity perspective: the contention that it is unfair – and thus abu-
sive – for dominant platforms to favour their own activities in markets where
they compete with independent businesses which rely upon the platform to
access consumers. In effect, the dominant firm must secure equitable market
access for competitors; a duty that, self-evidently, departs from its default ‘free-
dom to conduct a business’.
While dominant firms have a well-established ‘special responsibility’ to en-
sure that their conduct does not ‘impair genuine undistorted competition,’186
what is notable about Shopping is the Commission’s refusal to delimit the pa-
rameters of the prohibition on self-preferencing by reference to the Bronner
criteria on refusal to supply.187 Bronner makes any duty to pro-actively assist ri-
vals contingent upon demonstrating the objective necessity – ‘indispensability’–
of doing so,188 the rationale being that a denial of access to indispensable in-
puts is likely to harm effective competition to the detriment of consumers.189
Departure from the objective criterion of indispensability raises the prospect
of assessing the duty to assist by reference to subjective metrics such as
181 ibid, 13.
182 See notes 100-101 above.
183 The text of AdSense was unpublished at time of writing.
184 T–612/17 Google and Alphabet and T–604/18 Google and Alphabet, respectively.
185 Competition Policy for the Digital Era n 176 above, 7.
186 C-322/81 Michelin EU:C:1983:313 at [10].
187 Shopping n 172 above at [651].
188 C-7/97 Oscar Bronner EU:C:1998:569 (Bronner) at [41].
189 AT.39759 – ARA Decision of 20 September 2016 at [112]-[113].
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convenience to, or fairness judged from the perspective of, would-be rivals,
a possibility rejected in Bronner.190 Although the Commission in Shopping was
at pains to demonstrate distortive competitive effects,191 it thus failed to make a
compelling case about consumer harm.
Accordingly, self-preferencing represents a substantive step away from the
more economic approach towards a more holistic fairness-oriented assess-
ment.192 Vestager recognised as much when she described self-preferencing as
raising ‘a broader issue for our societies, of whether we think it’s right for com-
panies like Google and others to have such control over the success or failure
of other companies’.193 The Commissioner concluded that, ultimately, ‘we may
find that we need regulation’ to address such concerns.194 Yet Shopping demon-
strates that it is possible to cloak what is, inherently, a value judgment about the
optimal organisation of society within the language and methodology of com-
petition enforcement. Although there is not a single reference to ‘fairness’ or
‘unfair’ behaviour in the Shopping decision, this ethos is intrinsic to the theory
of harm.
Another noteworthy aspect of self-preferencing is its novelty. In Shopping, the
Commission insisted that leveraging ‘constitutes a well-established, indepen-
dent, form of abuse falling outside the scope of competition on the merits.195
The precedents cited do not support the contention of such a free-standing the-
ory of harm,196 however, and the grounds by which the Bronner criteria were
rejected are unconvincing.197 The progressive development of competition law
is not only permissible but arguably is to be applauded. Yet the Commission’s
failure to embrace and explain the novelty of its progressive policymaking is re-
grettable, particularly in light of Vestager’s efforts to make the case for the such
a role. (The Commissioner subsequently acknowledged that self-preferencing
constitutes at least a ‘new example’within the established case-law.198) It is dif-
ficult to avoid the suspicion that such reluctance was motivated by the desire to
190 Bronner n 188 above at [44]-[45].
191 Shopping n 172 above at [589]-[643].
192 Arguably,Bronner encapsulates an alternative conception of fairness, balancing the right of dom-
inant firms to run their businesses and the necessity for intervention in ‘exceptional circum-
stances’ to benefit rivals and consumers; see Opinion of AG Jacobs in C-7/97 Oscar Bronner
EU:C:1998:264.
193 MV Speech, 27 August 2019, n 76 above.
194 See, in this regard, Regulation 2019/1150 on promoting fairness and transparency for business
users of online intermediation services (OJ L186/57, 1 July 2019), and proposals for a Digital
Services Act (European Commission, ‘Commission launches consultation to seek views on Dig-
ital Services Act package’ 2 June 2020) and quasi-regulatory ‘new competition tool’ (European
Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission consults stakeholders on a possible new competition tool’
2 June 2020).
195 Shopping n 172 above at [649].
196 Shopping ibid at [334]. The case-law cited is of questionable reliability (T-288/97 Irish Sugar),
premised upon a distinct theory of harm like tying or predation (C-333/94 Tetra Pak), or was
superseded by or explicitly applies Bronner (C-311/84 Telemarking and T-201/04 Microsoft, re-
spectively).
197 In Shopping ibid at [651], the Commission stated that Bronner pertains only to the required remedy,
whereas the Court in Bronner n 188 above at [41], applied the criteria to determine ‘the existence
of an abuse’.
198 ‘Competition and the digital economy’ Speech, 3 June 2019.
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impose a then record-breaking, headline-catching fine, in line with the more
demonstrative fairness function discussed above.199
Hot on the heels of Shopping cameAndroid,where the Commission found vi-
olations of Article 102 through tying, exclusive dealing and anti-fragmentation
policies involving Google’s mobile operating system,Android.Although as ret-
icent as in Shopping to embrace the language of fairness, in substance its analysis
represents a wholesale abandonment of the more economic approach – and
thus must be seen, impliedly, as a victory for fairness,whatever the latter entails.
While the cornerstone of the more economic approach is the concept of anti-
competitive foreclosure,Android contains almost no mention, and certainly no
analysis, of the latter: the ‘anticompetitive’ limb appears to have been jettisoned
entirely.
The alleged tying practices, for instance, were assessed solely by reference to
the ‘competitive advantage’ that they afforded to Google’s own products.200 In
assessing the anti-fragmentation practices, similarly, consumer harm or benefit
was largely immaterial; the question was whether Google’s behaviour was ca-
pable of hindering the development of competing products.201 In relation to
exclusive dealing, about which the Commission suffered its high-profile defeat
in Intel, it nominally considered, as Intel decreed that it must,202 the capability of
the practices to harm competition.203 Yet far from constituting a full-blown rule
of ‘rule-of-reason,’204 the Commission engaged in an abstract assessment of the
potential impact of Google’s behaviour on the incentives of market actors.205
Moreover, although it ostensibly conducted an ‘as-efficient competitor’ analysis,
the starting point was the low market shares of Google’s existing rivals, which
suggests that ‘efficient’ competition is not the point.206 The Commission’s main
objection was a potential (entirely speculative) detriment to innovation.207 Cru-
cially, however, the decision was premised on the assumption that foreclosure is
inherently ‘anticompetitive’; an assumption that holds true insofar as maintain-
ing structurally-competitive markets is the policy goal,208 but which is harder to
square with the consumer welfare-focused vision espoused by the Commission
itself under the more economic approach.209
Android, like Shopping before it, hinges on the presumed entitlement of eco-
nomic actors to fair market opportunities.Although impact on consumers is not
irrelevant, it is essentially peripheral. The upshot of Android was that, prohib-
ited from monetising its investment through preinstallation,Google resorted to
199 Where the Commission finds a novel violation of competition law, standard practice is either to
refrain from fining or to discount for novelty.
200 For each tying claim, the Commission dedicated a single paragraph (of 1,481 in total) to assert
that the conduct was ‘capable of harming,directly or indirectly,consumers’by diminishing choice
(Android n 172 above at [863] and [971]).
201 Android ibid at [1076]-[1113].
202 Intel n 83 above at [138]-[139].
203 Android n 172 above at [1188]-[1191].
204 cf N. Petit, ‘The Judgment of the EU Court of Justice in Intel and the Rule of Reason in Abuse
of Dominance Cases’ (2018) 43 ELRev 728.
205 Android n 172 above at [1208]-[1281].
206 ibid at [1225]-[1126].
207 ibid at [1313]-[1322].
208 n 54 above.
209 In particular,Enforcement Priorities n 143 above.
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charging manufacturers a licensing fee to incorporate its previously-free pro-
prietary apps:210 an additional cost which it is difficult to imagine not being
passed on to final consumers. Android nonetheless suggests that higher prices
are considered a fair price to pay to secure ‘a fair, fighting chance to succeed’211
for smaller businesses within the digital economy.
Corporate Taxation, State Aid and the Need to ‘Do Something’
Another area where fairness plays a role is in defence of the Commission’s
most contentious recent State aid decisions, namely its pursuit of national tax
rulings granting favourable treatment to certain undertakings.212 ‘Fairness’ in
corporate taxation is a key theme in EU law,213 albeit efforts at harmonisation
have stalled.214 Of interest for our purposes is how this idea spills over into
competition enforcement, in particular through an expansive reading of the
‘selectivity’ and ‘advantage’ requirements which enables the Commission to
condemn the individualised tax treatment of large firms.215
It is widely recognised that the pursuit of corporate tax policies through State
aid enforcement is a ‘second best’ solution, necessitated by the impossibility of
persuading Member States to accept harmonisation.216 Nonetheless, what is
most remarkable about the deployment of a fairness-based justification here is
that this is directed, primarily, at the consequences that follow from a societal
perspective where companies avoid tax: namely, that ‘governments have to cut
vital services, or put even more of the costs onto those who are least able to
pay,’217 versus a world where ‘governments can afford the safety nets that keep
people feeling secure.’218 (An irony of such ‘unfairness’ is that it is precisely
certain national governments that facilitate these practices through domestic tax
policies.) Such concerns are compelling from a public policy perspective, and
in a 2018 interview, Vestager explained that the Commission prioritised these
cases because of EU-wide public anger about tax avoidance, and a perceived
need to ‘do something’ within its limited powers in this sphere.219
What this explanation lacks is an obvious link to the applicable legal standard
under the State aid rules.220 It thus remains to be seen whether this evolution can
withstand judicial scrutiny.The response to date has been mixed, suggesting that
the legality of ‘unfair’ tax arrangements turns less on inherent unconscionability,
210 ‘Google to start charging a licensing fee after EU Android ruling’ Politico 16 October 2018.
211 n 74 above.
212 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/tax_rulings/index_en.html.
213 n 267 below.
214 Traversa, ‘Editorial’ (2019) 47 Intertax 244.
215 A.Giraud and S. Petit, ‘Tax Rulings and State Aid Qualification: Should Reality Matter?’ (2017)
16 European State Aid LawQuarterly 233,and L.Panci, ‘Latest Developments on the Interpretation
of the Concept of Selectivity in the Field of Corporate Taxation’ (2018) 17 European State Aid
Law Quarterly 353.
216 Panci, ibid, 363.
217 MV Speech, 8 February 2019, n 79 above.
218 MV Speech, 25 January 2019, n 131 above.
219 ‘Interview with Margrethe Vestager: “We are doing this because people are angry”’The Observer
17 September 2018.
220 Art 107(1).
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and more on technical questions regarding the parameters of the national
rules.221 This proved to be the fate of the Apple case before the General Court,
which dismissed higher-level claims regarding the Commission’s competence
to pursue domestic tax policies under competition law, but nonetheless struck
down the incompatibility decision on the basis that the Commission failed to
establish that the relevant rulings constituted an ‘advantage’ on their facts.222
Thus Apple is reconcilable with the existing case-law without necessarily em-
bracing – or rejecting – the fairness mantra. Given the case’s potent mixture
of tax justice and digital economy concerns, however, the Commission’s defeat
may present more of a public relations dilemma than a jurisprudential one.223
Article 101 and ‘Business as Usual’ Against Vertical Restraints
Both the Google and the taxation cases, it is argued, represent the expansive
application of the competition rules in a novel fashion that reflects fairness-
based considerations. In parallel, the Commission has pursued enforcement
against vertical restraints in the e-commerce sphere,where the reverse occurred:
namely, it adopted a ‘business as usual’ approach by applying earlier jurispru-
dence, but which is entirely at odds with the case-by-case analysis advocated
under the more economic approach.
That vertical restraints potentially constitute ‘by object’ restrictions has long
been recognised.224 These cases moreover concern resale price maintenance
(RPM) policies and restrictions on cross-border resales, both of which have
firmly been placed within the ‘object box’.225 Yet the intervening decades have
seen a sharp rejection of the ‘per se’ scepticism that underlies the existing prece-
dents,226 alongside strong re-statements from the Court of Justice of the need to
assess restrictions within their legal and economic context.227 Thus the sort of
literalism in Binon – where the Court read the reference in Article 101(1)(a) to
practices that ‘directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices’ as an automatic
prohibition on RPM228 – is incompatible both with the direction of the more
economic approach, and, arguably, the Court’s recent pronouncements.229
Yet in a series of infringement decisions, the Commission has opted precisely
to follow its older ‘by object’ treatment, without acknowledging the criticisms
of this approach or any potential incompatibility with its more economic pre-
scriptions.230 Construing these cases in substantive fairness terms is perhaps a
221 Contrast the Commission’s diverging fate in T-755/15 Luxembourg v Commission and T-759/15
Fiat Chrysler EU:T:2019:670,and in T-760/15Netherlands vCommission and T-636/16 Starbucks
EU:T:2019:669;see also A.Lamadrid,‘The Fiat and Starbucks Judgments’Chillin’Competition Blog
25 September 2019.
222 T–778/16 Apple v Commission EU:T:2020:338.
223 A. Lamadrid, ‘The Apple Judgment in Context’Chillin’ Competition Blog 15 July 2020.
224 Consten n 147 above.
225 ibid, and C-243/83 Binon EU:C:1985:284.
226 Notably, US Supreme Court decision in Leegin v PSKS, 551 US 877 (2007).
227 Including C-67/13P CB EU:C:2014:2204 and C-307/18 Generics (UK) EU:C:2020:52.
228 Binon n 225 above at [44].
229 Particularly, C-345/14 Maxima EU:C:2015:784.
230 AT.40465 – Asus, AT.40469 – Denon & Marantz, AT.40181 – Philips, AT.40182 – Pioneer, Deci-
sions of 24 July 2018;AT.40428 –Guess Decision of 17 December 2018; 40436 – Nike Decision
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stretch: while we are dealing with the digital economy, the presumed villainy
of our defendants is less readily apparent. E-commerce is nonetheless a topic to
which the Commission has directed considerable recent attention, being rele-
vant to its roles both of protecting consumers and furthering integration (the
‘digital single market’).231 As with the Google cases, the Commission chose to
pursue these as infringement decisions and to impose fines, in notable contrast
to, for instance, the equivalent stream of enforcement that followed the Energy
Sector Inquiry a decade previously.232 Moreover, while these cases align with a
claimed tendency to prefer the ‘by object’ category in Article 101 enforcement
generally,233 the Commission’s approach was remarkable, both for its unthink-
ing adherence to a legalistic, defiantly non-effects-based approach, and for the
use of informal settlement procedures which ensure that none the decisions
were challenged before the Court.234 This strand of case-law thus aligns with
the view of fairness as other than the more economic approach, even if, again, it
leaves open the question of what, precisely, replaces it.
Fairness Beyond Big Tech? Enforcing a ‘Responsibility to the Public’
Finally, fairness considerations reach beyond the digital economy. Arguably re-
flective of a more acute awareness of its ‘responsibility to the public’235 alongside
the recognition that the fairness mantra gives to ‘fair prices,’236 the Commission
has pursued several recent cases with a distinct public interest quasi-regulatory
dimension.
In Gazprom, the Commission condemned an alleged ‘unfair pricing pol-
icy’ premised upon market segmentation, which enabled the dominant en-
ergy firm to extract excessively-high wholesale prices for natural gas.237 The
claimed unfairness pertained both to energy businesses, which were prevented
from ‘shopping around’ for better deals, and final consumers, who ultimately
bore the higher prices.238 Similarly, the ongoing Aspen Pharma investigation is
probing alleged price-gouging for cancer medication,239 a factual background
that unites a perfect storm of urgent public health concerns and over-stretched
of 25 March 2019; 40432 – Sanrio Decision of 9 July 2019; and 40433 – NBCUniversal Decision
of 30 January 2020.
231 European Commission, Final report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry COM(2017)229.
232 European Commission,Report on energy sector inquiry SEC(2006)1724.
233 A.Witt, ‘The Enforcement of Article 101 TFEU –What Has Happened to the Effects Analysis?’
(2018) 55 CMLRev 417.
234 European Commission, Factsheet: Cooperation—FAQ 17 December 2018 at https://ec.europa.
eu/competition/publications/data/factsheet_guess.pdf .
235 n 94 above.
236 n 81 above.
237 AT.39816 – Gazprom Decision of 24 May 2018.
238 European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission imposes binding obligations on Gazprom to
enable free flow of gas at competitive prices in Central and Eastern European gas markets’ 24
May 2018.
239 European Commission, ‘Antitrust:Commission opens formal investigation into Aspen Pharma’s
pricing practices for cancer medicines’ 15 May 2017.
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public purses.240 Both energy and pharmaceuticals are ‘old economy’ mar-
kets, but their strategic importance is reflected in an established pattern of
Commission-level scrutiny.241 Excessive pricing, as noted, has always been pro-
hibited under Article 102(a).242 What makes these recent decisions remarkable
is the willingness of the Commission to apply this prohibition, although such
cases fall outside its ‘enforcement priorities’ articulated a decade ago.243
The policy decision to embrace innovation as a central concern within the
Commission’s merger control practice is also framed in fairness terms.244 In
some ways, this claim to fairness is uncontentious, focused on ensuring better
products for future consumers. In the leading decision – Dow/Dupont, con-
cerning the seeds and agrochemicals sectors245 – the Commissioner expressed
herself in the most tangible of terms: ‘This is literally a question about our daily
bread’.246 Yet the simplicity of the message belies the analytical complexity, and
attendant uncertainty, of this shift in practice. Here again, the language of fair-
ness functions as a proxy for expansion of the competition rules in a manner
that is not necessarily problematic in substance, but which represents more of a
departure from the orthodoxy of the ‘consumer welfare prescription’ than the
Commission is prepared to admit.247
This discussion sought to demonstrate two points.First,despite assertions to the
contrary, fairness as a standard for intervention does not align with the more
economic approach,even if the latter can be construed loosely in fairness terms.
Second,recent enforcement does not demonstrate faithful adherence to the pre-
cepts of the more economic approach, adopted by the Commission with much
fanfare in the recent past. Fairness remains a subsidiary influence: evolution
not revolution, as its proponents insist. Yet these examples show that fairness
considerations can and do motivate the innovative interpretation, and proactive
application, of competition law today. No single definition of what constitutes
‘fairness’ can be distilled; instead, what unites this activity is an assumption that
the underlying problems represent a compelling public concern and merit an
urgent solution. In this sense, these cases reflect a well-established tradition of
‘antitrust imperialism,’248 whereby enforcers have long laid claim to expansive
ever-evolving powers which extend the ambit of competition law over the os-
tensible jurisdiction of national regulators. Yet what distinguishes the fairness
240 Considered in European Commission, Competition Enforcement in the Pharmaceutical Sector
(2009-2017). European competition authorities working together for affordable and innovative medicines
COM(2019)17.
241 See Energy Sector Inquiry Report n 232 above, and European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector
Inquiry Final Report 8 July 2009.
242 n 153 above.
243 Enforcement Priorities, n 143 above, para 7, recognise but fail to consider exploitative abuses.
244 MV Speech, 29 November 2018, n 73 above; also JL Speech, 10 October 2017, n 4 above.
245 M.7932 – Dow/Dupont Decision of 27 March 2017.
246 ‘EU greenlights Dow-DuPont mega-merger raising food security fears’The Guardian 27 March
2017.
247 For example N. Jung and E.Sinclair, ‘Innovation Theories of Harm in Merger control’ (2019) 40
ECLR 266; and N.Petit, ‘Innovation Competition,Unilateral Effects and Merger Policy’ (2019)
82 Antitrust L J 873.
248 D. Bailey, ‘The new frontiers of Article 102 TFEU: antitrust imperialism or judicious interven-
tion?’ (2018) 6 J Antitrust Enforcement 25.
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mantra from other gap-filling or ‘regulator’s regulator’249 cases is the manner in
which such innovation is defended: not by reference to the need to harmonise,
strengthen or prioritise enforcement of the hierarchically-superior EU rules,250
but rather linked to the legitimacy of the broader project of integration. It is
this aspect to which we now turn.
Understanding fairness in contemporary EU competition law
What is happening here? While it is easy to find defenders of fairness, commen-
tators are more coy about reconciling the day-to-day business of enforcement
with the higher-level values at stake.Moving beyond an account rooted in the
inherent appeal of fairness, we offer a tentative explanation which situates it
within wider contemporary concerns about the continued existence of the so-
cial market economy ideal.
First, however, it is necessary to rebut claims that the shift may be a develop-
ment internal to the discipline of competition law. The second section above
noted the looming presence of hipster antitrust, and it can reasonably be asked
whether the fairness mantra is a European variant.Certainly, parallels are drawn
in the literature,251 and there are parallels in substance. Both are born of the
same historical moment, a time of market scepticism; both advance a broader
vision of what antitrust should achieve, beyond securing low prices; and both
have an ideological dimension, characterised as the ‘New Brandeis School’252
and ‘Vestager School’253 respectively.
Yet, ultimately, their motivations and implications are sufficiently distinct
to require individual assessment. Hipster antitrust is an ‘outsider’ exercise,
originating outside the mainstream of antitrust scholarship and enforcement,
and launching an attack on both. While its successes should not be under-
estimated,254 there is limited institutional enthusiasm for its key prescription,
namely abandoning the consumer welfare standard.255 The shift to fairness,
by contrast, originates at the heart of the EU’s multi-layered enforcement
framework, and is an exercise in technocracy. There is also hipster antitrust’s
uncomfortable insistence on an originalist perspective, atypical in calls for
progressive intervention.256 Without overstating the infallibility of modern
249 G.Monti,EC Competition Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 495.
250 Opinion of AG Mazak in 280/08P Deutsche Telekom EU:C:2010:603 especially at [21].
251 L. Khan, ‘The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate’ (2018) 9 JECLAP
131.
252 ibid.
253 M.N. Volmar and K.O. Helmach, ‘Protecting consumers and their data through competition
law?’ (2018) 14 ECJ 195.
254 See for example FTC, ‘FTC’s Bureau of Competition Launches Task Force to Monitor Tech-
nology Markets’ 26 February 2019; and DOJ, ‘Justice Department Reviewing the Practices of
Market-Leading Online Platforms’ 23 July 2019.
255 Speech of AAGDelrahim,‘Stand ByMe:The ConsumerWelfare Standard and the First Amend-
ment’ 12 June 2018, and Speech of FTC Commissioner Wilson, ‘Welfare Standards Underlying
Antitrust Enforcement:What You Measure is What You Get’ 15 February 2019.
256 D.A. Strauss, ‘Originalism and Precedent:Why Conservatives Shouldn’t be Originalists’ (2008)
31 Harvard J L & Pub Pol’y 969.
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economics, there is something disturbing about a standpoint that blindly
rejects a century of intellectual progress based on the inconvenience of the
answers that it provides.257 Conversely, in the EU, efforts have been made to
reconcile the revival of fairness not only with its Treaty bases, but also recent
policy developments.258 Though arguably unconvincing, this suggests a further
basis for distinction, namely that hipster antitrust is an iconoclastic enterprise,
intended to prompt the ripping-up of the established antitrust rulebook. After
decades of Chicago School-influenced erosion, it is uncontentious that the
substantive scope of US antitrust today is inadequate. But hipster antitrust is
not a constructive movement, to the extent that this necessitates a detailed
blueprint for reform. Such an iconoclastic vision is explicitly disclaimed by
fairness proponents, so that instead the shift to fairness links to the progres-
sive development of the existing framework. The fairness mantra is thus an
empowering and amplifying concept, driving and justifying intervention.
Instead of representing hipster antitrust à l’Européen, therefore, the deliberate
adoption of fairness as the cornerstone of enforcement links to wider efforts
aimed at ‘upgrading [the EU’s] unique social market economy to fit today’s
new ambitions,’259 so that ‘the fight for fairness never stops.’260 This has two
dimensions: a retrospective element, looking backward to defend the market
regulation exercise; and a prospective element, guiding its future development.
The second section explained how the adequacy of the bargain struck within
existing understandings of the social market economy concept has been recon-
sidered as the polycrisis underlined existing disparities between its social and
economic components. This concept has traditionally functioned as a com-
promise between the competing claims of socialism and liberalism,261 yet in-
tegration is thinner in the social sphere.262 Moreover, precisely when many
Europeans became more vulnerable due to the effects of (EU-mandated) aus-
terity, efforts to pursue a European social policy had stalled.263 In considering
options for ‘the future of Europe,’264 an unduly laissez-faire approach to social
protection therefore risks imperilling the liberal economic model that underpins
integration efforts. To that end, the European Pillar of Social Rights was pro-
claimed in 2017, premised on the notion that ‘economic and social progress
are intertwined’.265 Of particular relevance is that the Pillar adopts a fairness
257 Arguing for maintaining an economic framework even within reinvigorated enforcement, see
J.B. Baker, J. Sallet and F. Scott-Morton, ‘Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement’ (2018) 127 Yale L J
1916, 1917.
258 See notes 100-101 above.
259 European Commission, ‘The von der Leyen Commission: for a Union that strives for more’ 10
September 2019.
260 Speech of von der Leyen, ‘Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session’ 16
July 2019.
261 D. Hildebrand, ‘The Equality and Social Fairness Objectives in EU Competition Law’Concur-
rences No 1-2017.
262 See for example C. Joerges, V. Bogoeski and L. Nüse, ‘Economic Constitutionalism and the
“European Social Model”’ in H.C.H. Hofmann et al (eds), The Metamorphosis of the European
Economic Constitution (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019).
263 P.Graziano andM.Hartlapp, ‘The end of social Europe? Understanding EU social policy change’
(2019) 26 JEPP 1484.
264 n 27 above.
265 European Pillar of Social Rights, Recital 11.
30
© 2020 The Authors. The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited.
(2020) 00(0) MLR 1–35
Niamh Dunne
standard for the latter.266 Fairness has also been adopted as the metric by which
to implement other elements of the broader regulatory framework to tame
more malign aspects of modern capitalism,267 while such themes were repli-
cated in the rhetoric of the incoming von der Leyen Commission.268 The up-
shot is a renewed interest, and perceived urgency, in making the case for the
social market economy as a compelling – but also indissociable – policy goal,
with ‘fairness’ at its core.
Current discussions of fairness in the competition context are, therefore,
partly motivated by the economic disruption of the past decade and the con-
comitant need to rehabilitate the social market economy concept. This links to
competition’s law longstanding role in reinforcing the internal market, and the
Commission’s multi-faceted responsibilities in the project of integration. Yet
the challenges of Europe today are more specific and acute.We live in an age of
market scepticism (questioning the desirability of ‘making markets work bet-
ter’), and of Euroscepticism (questioning the desirability of doing so specifically
at the European level). By using competition law to demonstrate that markets
can be fair as well as merely efficient, this shift in rhetoric provides a more
tangible, comprehensible, defensible rationale for the pursuit of market-focused
integration even in a time of market scepticism.
The aim is partly political: countering public mistrust and alienation and
the attendant swing towards (typically Euro-sceptic269) populist forces.Though
Vestager acknowledged the limits of antitrust – ‘[n]ot every case of unfairness is
a matter for competition law’270 – the claims made transcend the purely tech-
nical. EU competition law is not simply a matter of individualised enforcement
against transgressor undertakings; it is also plays a collective role in (re)building
the social market economy, by taming excessive or exploitative market forces
that threaten its already delicate balance. Drawing on the Ordoliberal roots of
EU competition policy,Vestager endorsed its conceptualisation as ‘the basic law
of the social market economy’.271 To the extent that there is an accepted need
to reprioritise the social aspect of Europe, reorienting competition law towards
a fairness-based rationale fits with the emerging narrative that the economic
and the social are intertwined and mutually reinforcing.
Of particular significance is the rise of populism and the role that compe-
tition law might play in stemming the tide of anti-market illiberal forces. The
Commissioner’s approach is nuanced, acknowledging that ‘when people have
the sense that markets aren’t listening to their needs, we shouldn’t be surprised
if they start to look for radical alternatives.272 Without legitimating the claims
266 ibid, Recital 14: ‘The European Pillar of Social Rights expresses principles and rights essential
for fair and well-functioning labour markets and welfare systems’ (emphasis added).
267 Regulation 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ C119/1, 4 May 2016) Art 5(1)(a);
and European Commission, A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union
COM(2015)302.
268 See notes 259-260 above.
269 M.Kneuer, ‘The tandem of populism and Euroscepticism: a comparative perspective in the light
of the European crises’ (2019) 14 Contemporary Social Science 26.
270 ‘Setting priorities in antitrust’ Speech, 1 February 2016.
271 ‘Competition and Europe’s Digital Future’ Speech, 14 March 2019.
272 ‘Restoring trust in our economy’ Speech, 27 January 2017.
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of populism,273 she recognised that these should be considered and addressed
in competition policy.274 Provocatively for an antitrust enforcer, she rejected
steadfast deference to the market where the outcome is that ‘people simply
have to suffer’ from its efficient operation.275 Thus the fairness mantra might
be construed, not only as a shot at redemption for the social market economy,
but also a warning shot hinting at the potentially disastrous consequences of
ignoring fairness considerations within the integration project.276
Yet there is arguably a more self-interested, borderline existential aspect to
this exercise for DG Competition. If the competition rules are about ‘making
markets work better,’ then, necessarily, their social value is contingent upon
the value to society of well-functioning markets. Accordingly, the shift towards
fairness might be seen as a self-justificatory exercise. By appealing to a concept
that is more readily recognisable and acceptable to a jaded European public,
the fairness mantra makes a compelling case for the continued significance of
competition enforcement. The logic is simple: applying competition law leads
to fairer markets, leading to a fairer society, in contradistinction to the turmoil
and injustice of the recent past.Despite lingering public scepticism of the added
value provided by ‘experts from organisations with acronyms,’277 what might be
perceived as the populist (or certainly popular) cause of recalibrating European
society towards a more equal and accountable model is furthered by greater
levels of ostensibly technocratic ‘elite’ enforcement.
Of course, one may legitimately doubt the extent to which ordinary Eu-
ropeans take heed of policy pronouncements of the Competition Commis-
sioner,278 even if trust-busting is back on the public’s radar.What such language
achieves, however, is to pave the way for the essentially performative – as op-
posed to strictly legal – function of aggressive and high-profile enforcement on
a fairness basis, which, as discussed above, does garner public attention.
Additionally, the fairness mantra has a prospective element.Fairness, as noted,
is an instinctively appealing but substantively elusive concept. It is thus well-
suited as an enforcement standard where the competition rules are applied
proactively to address unusual forms of bad business behaviour in innovative
or emerging markets. Contrary to concerns outlined above about the slipperi-
ness of fairness as a standard for intervention, it is precisely its imprecision which
liberates rather than constrains – and thus explains its appeal.
There are two factors at play, both of which emerged in our consideration
of recent enforcement. First, there is the rise of the digital economy, and with
it, new markets, business models and ways of potentially harming competition
(and society beyond). Second, linked to the accepted need to rebalance the so-
cial market economy, there is increased recognition of the ‘responsibility to the
public’of enforcers,279 namely an obligation to give priority to market problems
of wider social concern.As Vestager put it, ‘as the world changes, and new types
273 ‘Fighting fear with factfulness – and engagement’ Speech, 3 September 2018.
274 MV Speech, 3 October 2018, n 69 above; and MV Speech, 25 January 2019, n 131 above.
275 ‘Renewing trust in politics’ Speech, 1 June 2017.
276 MV Speech, 22 November 2018, n 11 above.
277 n 127 above.
278 A. Lamadrid, ‘Competition Law as Fairness’ (2017) 8 JECLAP 147, 147.
279 MV Speech, 21 November 2016, n 82 above.
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of power and influence grow, the rules we have need to keep up’.280 In both
instances,well-established theories of harm and analytical frameworks find their
limits. The enforcement activity discussed above suggests that, in all areas, the
comparatively recent Commission guidance setting the direction of the more
economic approach is already outdated: self-preferencing finds no reference in
the Article 102 guidelines, for instance; the growth of e-commerce gives rise to
restraints beyond the contemplation of the vertical guidelines; and the merger
regime is subject to calls for expansion of its jurisdiction and the cognisable the-
ories of harm. It accordingly becomes necessary to construct revised theories
of liability, preferably composed in a manner consistent with the existing rules
and underpinning principles, yet which can be applied and adapted as necessary
within new market or social circumstances.281 Unlike the claims of originalism
propagated by hipster antitrust, however, the EU response looks outwards and
forwards. This unquestionably makes sense in a context where progressive de-
velopment is hardwired into the structure of the EU project, exemplified by
the (increasingly strained) notion of ‘ever closer union’.282 Given the breadth
and depth of integration in the intervening decades, moreover, regressing to
a mid-twentieth century vision of the role and reach of EU competition law
would be absurd.
Fairness nonetheless provides an obligingly generous and receptive base-
line for assessment in novel cases. On the one hand, the very elusiveness of its
content facilitates an expansive approach which focuses on injury rather than
precedent – in notable contrast to the ‘straightjacket’ of the more economic ap-
proach. On the other, reasoning by reference to fairness provides legitimation
for the implicit judicial (or agency) activism that ambitious theories of harm
tend to suggest. Of course, neither advantage suffices to counter the serious
concerns about coherence, consistency and certainty associated with fairness,
outlined in the fourth section above. Yet to the extent that this is a period
when EU law must address complex challenges, both economic and social,
fairness at least provides a gateway to the progressive development of the com-
petition rules. It may also open avenues, and provide impetus, to more concrete
legislative changes to achieve broadly the same ends.283
It becomes vitally important in such circumstances, however, to ensure ade-
quate ex post scrutiny of Commission decision-making by the Court of Justice.
High-profile disputes like those involving Google and Apple at least have the
benefit of ensuring the development of robust precedent, clarifying how and
to what extent fairness considerations fit into contemporary competition anal-
ysis.284 Enforcement approaches that essentially shield the Commission from
judicial supervision are more troubling.285 Notably, much of the Court’s re-
cent jurisprudence reflects the caution and concerns of the more economic
280 ‘Security and trust in a digital world’ Speech, 13 September 2019.
281 MV Speech, 7 November 2018, n 65 above.
282 Art 1(2) TEU.
283 n 194 above.
284 See notes 184 and 222 above.
285 n 234 above and accompanying text.
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approach,286 even if the Court does not consider itself bound by Commission
guidance.287 An open question is whether, as fairness-imbued enforcement ac-
tivity makes its way through the appeals processes, the Court might be similarly
persuaded to depart from its new course, or at least to broaden the category of
cognisable ‘effects’ for these purposes.
Finally, given the reach of EU law, one might ask why we see this shift in
the competition field specifically. As noted, reprioritisation of the social side of
the social market economy is an overarching concern within the contempo-
rary EU. Yet competition law provides an effective plane within which to take
such a stand, precisely because it is an elite technocratic field squarely within
the Commission’s jurisdiction. It is easier to be radical when such change can
be implemented without the need to reach agreement amongst several dozen
national governments, which may face domestic pressure to resist expansion of
the acquis.288 Most pragmatically, therefore, we suggest that Vestager embraced
the language and ethos of fairness precisely because she had the ability to do
so more straightforwardly than many of her colleagues. Moreover, while ac-
counts premised on Vestager’s charismatic authority or political ambitions fail
to give adequate weight to the wider context in which she exercised her role,
she was reappointed as Competition Commissioner in 2019 with an amplified
portfolio: an outcome that is surely a ‘fair’ reward for a successful term in office.
CONCLUSIONS
This article explored the revival of fairness as a guiding principle for competi-
tion law.The choice of the term ‘revival’ is apt, as many of the themes debated –
market opportunity, consumer exploitation, an understanding of antitrust harm
that transcends efficiency calculations, etc – would be readily cognisable to ear-
lier generations of antitrust scholars. The question of what fairness entails was
left unanswered, though multiple parallel narratives were identified. Indeed, the
sheer breadth of the distinct manifestations of fairness that are recognised is its
most volatile attribute, insofar as there is real potential for conflict and incoher-
ence amongst the competing interests at play. Yet, the fairness mantra is more
than simply a retreat to past arguments for hyper-aggressive intervention, and
its more nuanced nature distinguishes it, conspicuously, from hipster antitrust.
What is going on is largely political: chiming with the long-accepted reality
of competition law as a political enterprise, despite its veneer of economics-
mandated impartiality.As a matter of principle, the fairness mantra suggests that
the social side of the social market economy equation should receive adequate
attention in applying the rules that regulate the market side of the bargain.More
cynically, the shift in rhetoric may seek to make the case for the social market
economy as a complementary and indissociable whole – and not two concepts
286 Including CB n 227 above,Generics (UK) n 227 above, C-230/16 Coty EU:C:2017:941, Intel n
83 above,MEO n 158 above, and on merger control, T-399/16 CK Telecoms EU:T:2020:217.
287 T-286/09 Intel EU:T:2014:547.
288 cf Zeitlin et al, n 24 above, 972.
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inherently at loggerheads, as the last chaotic decade in Europe arguably suggests.
The fairness mantra thus represents an attempt by the discipline of competition
law ‘to reconcile it with society’.289 Against this perspective, the most potent
concern is that by redirecting competition law to place greater focus on pop-
ulist fears, the system may expose itself to counterproductive outcomes, overt
politicisation, or even corruption.290 Yet this does not mean that the search for
fairness should be dismissed, even if it introduces known risks.
The fairness mantra, at its core, provides a rationale for the progressive devel-
opment of competition law, and some (albeit loose) indication of the optimal
direction of travel. What will be vitally important in coming years is how the
Commission approaches the task of advancement and reform: not merely in
terms of the types of cases that are pursued, but how such cases are analysed
and explained by reference to both the existing jurisprudence and any radical
departures, alongside adequate ex post scrutiny by Union Courts. Fairness may
be an elusive, even rhetorical concept; but competition law and its enforcement
are necessarily real-world endeavours. To the extent that the competition-as-
fairness mantra may become the primary driver of EU competition law,it would
benefit from a concomitant dose of frankness, to ensure fair outcomes in all
senses.
289 Lamadrid, n 278 above, 148.
290 ibid, 147.
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